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EYES ONLY

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This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the

Jke President at a meeting in the

White House on 17 March 1960.

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2

(Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition.

The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.

(Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition.

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16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. Intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

- a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba.

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d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3.

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PROPAGANDA

1.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region.

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MEMORANDUM

17 MAY 1961

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Development and Emergence of the Revolutionary Council

1. As Castro's true position became progressively more apparent in the first half of 1959, much consideration was given by the State Department here and "The Country Team" in Havana to the possible posture of U. S. policy toward Cuba. The general conclusion reached in the latter part of 1959 was that any group or coalition of groups which could hope to supplant the Castro regime could gain popular acceptance only on the basis of continuing the revolution with more practical management and less nationalist, socialist and Marxist contact; the United States would have to disassociate itself from Batista elements which would rush to undo the revolution. Elements within the Department of State catalogued actual or potential opposition to Castro as follows:

- a. The Autenticos (Antonio de Varona).
- b. The Monticristi (Justo Carrillo).
- c. Triple A (Sanchez Arango).
- d. Catholic Labor and Youth.
- e. Ex-26 July Members.
- f. Ex-Batista elements.

2.

3. As the project approached its stage of formalization, i.e. approval on the highest governmental level, the possible composition of a "junta" was discussed on the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State level. After the project was approved on 17 March 1960, the Department was kept fully informed of each step leading to the eventual formation of the FRD on 11 May 1960 and its advice on personalities and substance was sought regularly. There was no objection to the original Varona, Carrillo, Reasco, Artimo (and later Sanchez Arengo) constellation. Coordination with the Department continued throughout the entire project: In September 1960 the Department's advice was sought on the inclusion of additional personalities into the FRD Executive Committee, such as Manuel Ray; in January 1961 the problems inherent in the establishment of a "Provisional Government" were discussed both in terms of personalities and substance; on 13 February 1961 approval was received for the establishment of a Revolutionary Council with the understanding that there should be no U.S. interference and that the Cubans were to nominate anyone they saw fit as

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Council President; also, the President was to be free to select his own Council members. The current Council-composition is the result of this understanding. (Biographies of FRD and Council members were previously transmitted to General Taylor.)

4. The FRD political platform and the Revolutionary Council's programs

In the early stages of the project General FRD utterances fell into the broad category "restore the revolution." Later the FRD and Council statements became more specific. By and large, the tenor and posture of the Council and FRD is liberal and fairly progressive; its legal framework is the 1940 Cuban Constitution; land reform is part of its program as is the possible nationalization of certain industries. None of the Council members desires to turn the clock back; there are naturally differences among the Cubans as to detail and pace for future actions.

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~~Reference to JCS Directive~~
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

27 January 1961
JCSM-44-61
UB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Plan of Action in Cuba (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned with the situation presented by steadily increasing military strength of the Castro Government and the tight grasp of the Communists over the means of counter-revolution, including the military, the police and governmental financial resources as well as the organs of propaganda. Unless the United States takes immediate and forceful action, there is a great and present danger that Cuba will become permanently established as a part of the Communist Bloc, with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Cuba provides a Communist base of operations for export of similar revolutions to an already unstable and potentially explosive Latin America.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the primary objective of the United States in Cuba should be the speedy overthrow of the Castro Government, followed by the establishment of a pro-U.S. Government which, with U.S. support, will

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(JCS 2304/19 - Approved 27 Jan 61)

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accomplish the desired objectives for the Cuban people. Great emphasis is placed on the urgent necessity for the United States to locate, train and support such Cuban nationals as will be capable of establishing a new non-Communist government once Castro is overthrown.

3. The current Political-Para-Military Plan does not assure the accomplishment of the above objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate.

4. As you recall, at the conference between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1961 this problem was addressed. At that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a Joint Staff concept of an ascending scale of U.S. supported or directed actions to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro Government. This concept, which is appended hereto, was intended to demonstrate the key elements in the development of an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government. That conference informally agreed that an Inter-Departmental Planning Group should be established to develop a detailed over-all U.S. Plan of Action along the general lines indicated in the Appendix.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that:

a. An over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government be developed by an Inter-Departmental Planning Group.

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b. Such an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government include, but not be limited to the following:

(1) Mission

(2) Each feasible course of action (as set forth in the Appendix hereto, or as revised by the planners), with sub-elements as follows:

(a) The concept of operations for the course of action.

(b) Specific Tasks required of Executive Agencies concerned to accomplish the course of action.

(3) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) Designation of Agency or individual responsible for inter-departmental coordination and arrangement for reviewing and approval of the Plan.

(4) Requirements for supporting plans.

(5) Special provisions for continuous evaluation of the situation as a basis for determining U.S. course of action.

(6) Command relationships for implementation of each course of action.

c. The resultant over-all U.S. Plan of Action, after review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate agencies and approval by the President, be supported by detailed plans by the cognizant Executive Agencies for the implementation of tasks set forth in the over-all U.S. Plan of Action.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to assign personnel to participate in this Inter-Departmental Planning for the Department of Defense.

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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APPENDIX

CONCEPT OF ACTIONS

(chart)

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JCSM-44-61

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
		INTERNAL UPRISING	VOLUNTEER INVASION FORCE W/ COVERT SUPPORT	GUERRILLA FORCE WITH COVERT SUPPORT	VOLUNTEER INVASION FORCE WITH OVERT ACTION	OVERT U.S. ACTION SUPPORTED BY L. A. VOLUNTEERS	UNILATERAL OVERT U. S. ACTION
	PRESSURE						
CONCEPT	ECONOMIC BREAK DIP RELATIONS O.A.S. ACH. PROPAGANDA & INFO. NAVAL/AERIAL SURVEILLANCE EMBARGO SHOW OF FORCE COMM & TRANS. ISOLATION	FOSTER THRU PROGANGANDA & PRESSURE A GENERAL INTERNAL UPRISING BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE	TRAIN AND EQUIP SMALL VOL. FORCE CUBAN EXILES TO INVADE, ESTABLISH A CENTER OF RESISTANCE FOR ANTI CASTRO GUERRILLAS TO RALLY TO ESTABLISH PRO U.S. GOVT	TRAIN ANTI CASTRO CUBAN EXILES IN U.W. INSERT INTO CUBA TO EST. U.W. UNITS INITIATE GUERRILLA WAR FARE W U S. COVERT SUPPORT	SAME AS (3), PLUS PLANNED OVERT FOLLOW UP BY U.S. FORCES NAVAL BLOCKADE	INVASION BY U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN CONJUNCTION W L.A. VOLUNTEERS NAVAL BLOCKADE	INVASION BY U.S. MILITARY FORCES ONLY. NAVAL BLOCKADE
MIL REQ.	NAVAL/AERIAL SURVEILLANCE EMBARGO SHOW OF FORCE	LOG. SUPT.	LOGISTIC SUPPORT	LOG. SUPT.	ARMY, NAVAL & A.F. COMBAT UNITS LOGISTIC UNITS SUPPLIES NAVAL BLOCKADE	SAME AS (5) NAVAL BLOCKADE	SAME AS (5) NAVAL BLOCKADE
STATUS OF MIL. REQ.	CURRENT NAVAL MANEUVERS	NO PLAN (PLAN BEING INITIATED)	SUPPORT PROVIDED AS REQUIRED	NO ACTION	NO ACTION (PLAN REQUIRED)	MODIFICATION OF CURRENT CONT. PLAN REQUIRED EST PRO GRAN OF L.A. VOL. REQ	CINCLANT CONTINGENCY PLAN (BEING MODIFIED)

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CONCEPT

MIL REQ.

STATUS OF MIL. REQ.

Appendix

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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January 28, 1961

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Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba
Cabinet Room, January 28, 1961

Present: The President, The Vice President, The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary Mann, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. Percy Foreman, Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting began with a description of the present situation in Cuba by the Director of Central Intelligence. The judgment expressed without dissent was that Cuba is now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state. The two basic elements in the present situation are a rapid and continuing build-up of Castro's military power, and a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime.

The United States has undertaken a number of covert measures against Castro, including propaganda, sabotage, political action, and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. A particularly urgent question is the use to be made of a group of such Cubans now in training in Guatemala, who cannot remain indefinitely where they are.

The present estimate of the Department of Defense is that no course of action currently authorized by the United States Government will be effective in reaching the agreed national goal of overthrowing the Castro regime. Meanwhile, the Department of State sees grave political dangers to our position throughout the Western Hemisphere in any overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States.

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After considerable discussion, the following proceedings were authorized by the President:

1. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, including increased propaganda, increased political action and increased sabotage. Continued overflights for these purposes were specifically authorized.
2. The Defense Department, with CIA, will review proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory, and the results of this analysis will be promptly reported to the President.

3. The Department of State will prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It is expected that this proposal may involve a commitment of the President's personal authority behind a special mission or missions to such Latin American leaders as Lleras, Betancourt and Quadros.

Bale

Finally, it was agreed that the United States must make entirely clear that its position with respect to the Cuban Government is currently governed by its firm opposition to Communist penetration of the American Republics, and not by any hostility to democratic social revolution and economic reform. The President intends to deal with this matter himself in the State of the Union Address.

The President particularly desires that no hint of these discussions reach any personnel beyond those most immediately concerned within the Executive Branch.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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McK.

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TRINIDAD PLAN
STK SAID "NO"

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JCSM 57-61

27 FEB 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan

Attached hereto is the Military Evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency Para-Military Plan, Cuba. Subject to your concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to forward copies of their assessment of the plan to the Director for Central Intelligence with the proposal that they meet with the Director for Central Intelligence and members of his staff for further discussion of this project.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff
L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

CLENNED

Attachment (16)

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3 Feb 61

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Evaluation of the CIA
Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the feasibility
of the military portion of the CIA plan for action to effect
the overthrow of the Castro Regime and arrived at the following
conclusions:

a. Since the success of this operation is dependent on
the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a
matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute
the operation is made.

b. Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff the
beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for
accomplishment of the Task Force mission.

c. There should be a review of the plan for air movement to
the embarkation point to eliminate the possibility of
compromise.

d. In view of the complexity of the loading and marshaling
phase of this amphibious operation, the current plans should
be reviewed to ensure detailed coordination and centralized
control.

e. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castro's
air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air
operations is within the capability of the Air units and
should be successful.

f. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault
would be opposed, it should be successful.

g. The amphibious assault should be successful even if
lightly opposed; however the personnel and plans for
logistic support, are marginal at best. Against moderate,
determined resistance logistic support as presently planned
will be inadequate.

Schedule
15 Feb 61
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h. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area is basically sound.

i. Additional planning is required concerning the control and utilization of indigenous facilities, and personnel both for combat and support functions.

j. It would appear more desirable for guerrilla bands to support from outside the beachhead area rather than combining with the invasion force as currently planned.

k. Without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas the Cuban Army could move substantial forces to the area by D / 2. Necessity to develop the situation and prepare a coordinated attack would take an estimated two additional days at a minimum. Interference by any of the three above factors would further delay a coordinated attack.

l. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks.

m. Even if the task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

n. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.

o. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21.

p. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be

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noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces 1
 is based upon second and third hand reports, and certain 2
 logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical 3
 to initial success. For these reasons, an independent 4
 evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force 5
 and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by 6
 a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers, if this can 7
 be done without danger of compromise of the plan. 8

US

g. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, 9
 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of 10
 this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if 11
 it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, 12
 could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro 13
 regime. 14

2. It is recommended that the enclosed study be forwarded 15
 to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for information 16
 and consideration. 17

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MILITARY EVALUATION OF PARA-MILITARY PLAN

THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the feasibility of the purely military 1
portion of the CIA plan for action to effect the overthrow 2
of Castro. 3

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The mission of the Task Force of Volunteer Cuban Exiles 4
is to: 5

*Trinidad
Plan*

a. Inveade the island of Cuba by amphibious and 6
airborne assault. 7
b. Hold a beachhead long enough to establish a pro- 8
visional government, act as a rallying point for volunteers 9
and as a catalyst for uprisings throughout Cuba. 10

c. Integrate with existing guerrilla bands and carry 11 *ASCA*
on guerrilla operations if driven from the beachhead area. 12

3. For facts on the enemy forces; dissident forces in the 13
general area of operations; the strength, organization and 14
equipment of the Task Force; the proposed general area of 15
operations; and the concept of operations, see Annex "A". 16

CONCLUSIONS

4. Since the success of this operation is dependent on 17
the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a 18
matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute 19
the operation is made. 20

5. Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff, 21
the beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba 22
for accomplishment of the Task Force mission. 23

6. There should be a review of the plan for air movement 24
to the embarkation point to eliminate the possibility of 25
compromise. 26

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7. In view of the complexity of the loading and marshaling 1
phase of this amphibious operation, the current plans should 2
be reviewed to ensure detailed coordination and centralized 3
control. 4

8. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castro's 5
air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air opera- 6
tions is within the capability of the air units and should 7
be successful. 8

9. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault 9
would be opposed, it should be successful. 10

10. The amphibious assault should be successful even if 11
lightly opposed. However, the personnel and plans for 12
logistic support are marginal at best. Against moderate, 13
determined resistance, logistic support as presently planned 14
will be inadequate. 15

11. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area 16
is basically sound. 17

12. Additional planning is required concerning the control 18
and utilization of indigenous facilities and personnel, both 19
for combat and support functions. 20

13. It would appear more desirable for guerrilla bands 21
to support from outside the beachhead area rather than com- 22
bining with the invasion force as currently planned. 23

14. Without interference from the air, obstacles or 24
guerrillas, the Cuban Army could move substantial forces to 25
the area by D+2. Necessity to develop the situation and pre- 26
pare a coordinated attack would take an estimated two addi- 27
tional days at a minimum. Interference by any of the three 28
above factors would further delay a coordinated attack. 29

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15. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks.

16. Even if the Invasion Task Force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-up forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

17. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.

18. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21.

19. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third-hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan.

20. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the basic memorandum for the Secretary of Defense which sets forth the above conclusions and recommends that a copy of this evaluation be forwarded to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency for his information and consideration.

A N N E X "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Enemy Forces. (Appendix "A" for details)

a. Cuban Army - Total, 32,000 personnel, including 9,000 police, organized into four infantry regiments (strength, 2,000), three artillery battalions, three tank battalions and one AAA battalion. Nearest Army force to beachhead is approximately 100 miles away, consisting of 6,000 troops (one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion and one tank battalion, not confirmed). In beachhead area, there is a police squadron.

b. Air Force - Three F-47; one F-51; 14 Sea Fury; 13 B-26; six TBM-38; 15 transport type aircraft; 22 helicopters of various types.

c. Navy - Total, approximately 5,000 personnel. Three PF; two PCE; 43 smaller craft.

d. Militia - Between 200,000 and 300,000 in strength. Well armed but combat capability is questionable. Approximately 1,200 militia are located in the beachhead area.

e. Combat Readiness of Cuban Armed Forces is low but improving. This improvement partially offset by deteriorating morale.

2. Friendly Forces. (Appendix "B" for details)

A. Cuban Task Force - 1,004 personnel.

(1) An Infantry Battalion of four rifle companies (one airborne), totaling approximately 826 personnel and armed to include 4.2 mortars and 77 mm recoilless rifles, and a tank platoon of 5 M41 tanks.

(2) An Air Force consisting of 17 B-26's; 10 C-54's; 5 C-46's; supported by approximately 100 personnel, 18 of which are pilots. Maintenance is excellent and has adequate logistic support.

(3) Navy - 3 LCU's; 2 LST type; 2 LCI; 4 LCP; 1 LSD (USN); and supported by approximately 40 Naval personnel.

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b. Guerrillas - In Cuba, total 1,500 but in general area of beachhead (25 mile radius) five bands with an estimated strength of 660.

g. Cuban Volunteers after invasion. CIA is counting on a sizeable number of indigenous volunteers. This support will undoubtedly develop but the numbers cannot be estimated. Arms for 1,500 volunteers are included in initial lift.

3. Characteristics of the Invasion Area.

a. Terrain - The beachhead area is generally semi-circular with a perimeter of approximately 11 miles. Within the beachhead area is a small city, a small airfield, roadnet and a river. The perimeter of the beachhead is generally anchored on low hill masses with a commanding hill mass, approximately 700 feet in height, at its north center. The area between the hill masses and the ocean is generally flat, with wooded and cultivated areas. Two good roads enter the area from the east and the west, with a railroad entering from the northeast. Tanks generally can operate throughout the beachhead.

b. Landing beaches - There are three small beaches in the landing area, two at river mouths and one on the west side of the bay formed by the rivers. The left river mouth beach is 100 to 150 yards in length, with 12 foot water depth up to the beach. The center beach, at the main river mouth, is 100 to 150 yards in length, with shoal water off the beach making it suitable only for LCVP's. The third beach, on the west side of the bay, is 50 to 60 yards in width with 7 feet of water up to the beach and easily identifiable by four buildings to the rear of the beach. Exits at all beaches are suitable for small vehicles, while the exit from the west beach

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Annex "A"

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is very good, suitable for vehicles and tanks. The seaward approaches are clear.

g. Airborne drop zone - The planned drop zone is approximately 2,000 yards in length, open and generally flat. It is located near the commanding hill mass within the beachhead. It is considered suitable for a company drop zone.

d. Strategic location - The beachhead is so located that it is remote from known concentrations of Cuban Army, access routes are limited and it can be readily isolated by cutting highway and railroad bridges at river crossings outside the beachhead area. Rugged terrain in the vicinity facilitates expansion of para-military operations.

4. Concept. (Appendix "C" for details) On D-1, air strikes are designed to neutralize Cuban Air Force, Cuban Naval patrol vessels, key communications facilities, and destroy tanks and artillery in parks. Second priority is isolation of the objective area. Following a feint on the night of D-1, prior to first light on D Day, the task force will invade by simultaneous air drop in the vicinity of the key hill mass and by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. Avoiding the city, control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominate entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in general area of operations. Small air strip in area will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. Force will establish control within beach-head area and if driven therefrom, be prepared to withdraw from beachhead area and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities. For detailed concept of air employment and capabilities, see Appendix "D" to Annex "A".

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5. Logistics. (Appendix "E" for details) The supply of Class I, III and V is adequate. The shipping is limited and allows no margin for miscalculation or unforeseen contingencies. Of the 826 personnel in the Brigade, only 18 are specifically designated for logistic tasks. These 18 are in the 85 man Brigade Headquarters. The quantities of Class I, III and V supplies are adequate for the operation. The Brigade is without engineer or bridging capability. Plans call for Class I, III and V supplies to be mounted-out from New Orleans, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These supplies are available for both air and surface lift. Transportation is adequate for the initial phases of the operation on an austere basis.

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Annex "A"

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APPENDIX "A" TO ANNEX "A"

ENEMY FORCES

1. Army

Strength - 52,000 (incl. 9,000 Rural Police)

Organization - 3 Tactical Combat Forces plus

1 Parachute Regiment (approximately 1500); 1 AA Battalion.

Each Tactical Force consists of:

1 Infantry Regiment (approximately 1900)

1 Artillery Battalion (approximately 435)

1 Armored Battalion (approximately 313)

1 Engineer Co. (approximately 125)

1 Signal Co. (approximately 100)

Total strength - 2873

Areas of Concentration:

Havana - Managua (approximately 5000)

Western Tactical Combat Force

AA Battalion

Armor School

Military Academy

Santa Clara (approximately 6,000)

Central Tactical Combat Force

Santiago de Cuba - Oriente Province

Eastern Tactical Combat Force

Parachute Regiment

General Area of Operations:

No army forces known to be in area except AA position at Topas de Colantes believed manned by Cuban Army personnel. MG positions on hills believed manned by militia personnel.

2. Militia

Strength: Estimated between 200,000 and 300,000.

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Organization: Heterogeneous. Each village and town has a militia unit. Size varies according to size of town. Unit assembled on call at local police post. Orders received via police communications net and transmitted by runner.

Weapons: Varied; however, most members of militia have been issued a weapon, some members multiple weapons. Many new automatic weapons are in hands of militiamen - submachine guns, especially.

General Area of Operations: Between 12,000 and 30,000 engaged with army units in anti-guerrilla operations in mountains. Militia training camp at Sanofi Spiritus has 1500 militiamen from other provinces in training. Local militia not trusted by Castro to fight Guerrillas. Militia stations are located at the mouths of rivers in area.

3. Navy

Strength: Estimated at approximately 5000.

Vessels: No major combat vessels.

1 Frigate (4" guns) located Santiago.

1 Frigate (4" guns) located Cienfuegos.

Various smaller craft engaged in patrol of north and south coasts. All ships and boats are subject to frequent prolonged stand-downs for maintenance. Intervened yachts being used for patrol purposes.

General Area of Operations: No combat vessels, but probably several small patrol craft on any given day. Frigates have very low combat potential due to age of craft, inexperienced crews, and high maintenance factor.

4. Air Forces

Strength: Total strength is unknown.

Aircraft: 1 F51

3 F47

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Appendix "A" to Annex "A"

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- 14 Sea Fury MK-1
- 13 B-26
- 6 TEM-33

Various transports and helicopters
 Some T-33, T-6, and N2S are in inventory
 but exact numbers are unknown.

- Locations: San Antonio de los Baños
 Santiago de Cuba
 Camaguey
 Campo Libertad (Havana)
 Baracoa (Helicopter)
 San Julian

General Area of Operations: No aircraft known to be based in the immediate area. However, Camaguey, San Antonio and Campo Libertad are within supporting range.

5. Police

Strength: Approximately 9000

Organization: 6 Regiments (1 per Military District - corresponds to Provincial Boundaries)
 Squadrons (approximately 165 each) (such regiment varies as to number of squadrons)

3 platoons per squadron

Police posts (4-15 men each) established by platoons.

General Area of Operations:

- 1. Squadron - Headquarters in objective area.

Police posts in each village and town vary in size from 5 - 50 men each.

6. Combat Readiness of Cuban Armed Forces.

- (1) Low but improving.
- (2) There have been no tank sightings in Las Villas province in over four months despite presence of a tank

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Appendix "A" to Annex "A"

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battalion at Santa Clara. Loyalty of armor personnel to Castro believed wavering.

- (3) Motor transport is provided by any type of conveyance available at the time needed.
- (4) Loyalty of militia very suspect.
- (5) Tactical communication facilities poor, especially to and among militia elements.
- (6) Naval units probably would seek to avoid contact with or detection of any amphibious force.
- (7) Qualified pilots in short supply for combat aircraft. Maintenance standards low and spare parts not available.

Appendix "A" to
Annex "A"

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APPENDIX "B" TO ANNEX "A"

FRIENDLY FORCES

1. General - The Task Force as currently organized consists of a ground force unit with a limited amphibious and airborne capability; a Naval support element and an Air Force combat and support element. Total strength of the Task Force is approximately 1,040 officers and enlisted men.

2. Ground Force Unit - The Ground Force Unit is organized along the lines of a U.S. Infantry Battalion but is called an Assault Force. Its total personnel strength is 826. Organization of the Assault Force is as shown below:

A. Assault Force

- 1 - Hqs and Support Co - 85 Personnel
 - (1) Brigade Hqs
 - (5) TACP's
 - (1) Supply Det.
 - (1) Medical Det.
- 4 - Rifle Companies - 161 Personnel each
 - (2) Rifle Companies
 - (1) Airborne (trained)
 - (1) Motorized (trained)
- 3 Rifle Platoons and 1 Weapons Platoon in each Rifle Company.
- 1 - Heavy Gun Company - 72 Personnel
 - 1 4.2 mm Mortar Plt.
 - 1 75 RR Plt.
 - 1 50 Cal. M.A. Plt.
- 1 - Tank Platoon - 25 Personnel
 - 5 M41 Tanks Mounting 76mm Gun

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Appendix "B" to Annex "A"

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b. Rifle Company Organization Personnel Strength 161

- 1 Co. Hqs. - 15 Personnel
- 3 Rifle Platoons - 39 Personnel each
- 3 Rifle Squads each - 9 Personnel each
- 1 Weapons Platoon - 29 Personnel
- 3 57 RR Rifle Squads with 1 57 RR Rifle each
- 3 81mm Mortar Crews, 1 81mm Mortar each

c. Heavy Gun Company Organization Personnel Strength 72

- 1 Co. Hqs - 10 Personnel
- 1 4.2mm Mortar Plt. - 22 Personnel 3 - 4.2 Mortar
- 1 50 Cal MG Plt - 15 Personnel 3 - 50 Cal MG's
- 1 75mm Recoilless Rifle Plt. - 15 Personnel 3 - 75 RR Rifles
- 1 81mm Mortar Plt. - 15 Personnel - 6 - 81mm Mortar

d. Summary of Weapons Within Assault Force

Pistols	235
M-1 Rifles	270
Grenade Launchers	27
Submachine Guns	330
BAR's	72
LMG's	24
50 Cal. M.G.'s	3
57mm Recoilless Rifles	12
75mm Recoilless Rifle	3
81mm Mortar	12
4.2mm Mortar	6
Flame Thrower	4
3.5 inch Rocket Launcher	12

(Drawing 6070A)

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Appendix "B" to Annex "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET - Limited Distribution2. Vehicles Assigned to Assault Force

Truck, 2 1/2 Ton	12
Truck, 1/2 Ton	11
Truck, 5 Ton Reefer, 3000 gal cap.	2
Tractor, D-6	1
Trailer, 6t. - Commo	2
Trailer, 1/2 Ton	9
Lift, Fork, 3 Ton	2
Tank, M41 A1	5

3. Communication Facilities. No detail breakdown provided.

However, man pack radios in sufficient numbers to establish an interassault Force Command Net will be issued. Also a command net to supply ship afloat will be established.

3. Naval Support Element. The current Naval Support Unit personnel strength is approximately 40. This includes eleven (11) personnel trained as an underwater demolition team. However, they may be employed to mark the channel approach for amphibious landing craft.

Vessels to Support Operations

LSU	3
LST (Type)	2
LCI	2
LCVP	4
LSD (US Navy)	1

4. Air Force Combat and Support Element. Current Air Force Unit personnel strength is approximately 100. This includes 18 trained pilots.

Appendix "B" to Annex "A"

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Aircraft Available

B 26	17
C 54	10
C 46	5

5. Special Purpose Detachment. To insure that key bridges in general area of operations are denied the enemy, a special purpose airborne detachment consisting of eighty (80) individuals has been trained to parachute into objective area and accomplish this mission.

6. Friendly Guerrilla Bands. According to the latest intelligence available, five Guerrilla Bands with a total estimated strength of 660 are active within a 25 mile radius of beachhead area. Another Band with an estimated strength of ninety (90) is approximately 35 miles East of beachhead area. Two additional Bands with a total estimated strength of 250 are located some 50 miles North of beachhead area.

7. Miscellaneous

a. Elements of the Task Force are receiving training at 3 separate locations.

b. Reportedly, personnel of the Task Force are well-trained and willing to fight. Leadership is effective and reliable.

c. Reports indicate that personnel have reached a fine edge of training which they will lose if not employed in the near future for purpose intended.

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Appendix "B" to
Annex "A"

ESCAMSA

Gualaquiza - La. - Mac. (EscamSA)

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(2) The Brigade is deficient in spare parts, and maintenance and repair capabilities.

d. Service

- (1) No engineer capability.
- (2) No bridging capability.

(3) No flood light trailers for beach and dump operations during darkness.

(4) Inadequate shore party personnel and equipment for handling heavy loads over the beach.

(5) No ships platoons. Comment was made that ships would be off-loaded by contract labor. More detailed planning will be necessary to ensure success.

(6) Plans are to move supplies across the beach as follows:

(a) Preloaded vehicles from LCU's over beach matting on 1st trip.

(b) Vehicles discharge loads in beach dumps, return to beach, reload aboard LCU's and return to sea to be loaded from ships hold. This plan has several serious defects:

1. LCU's must remain idle on shore until trucks unload in dumps.

11. Beach may be such that it will not permit sustained traffic even with beach matting.

111. To load truck in LCU's from ships at sea is impractical. This in view of the lack of ships platoons.

(7) Plans for the provision of resupply of Class III are inadequate. The two 3000 gal refuelers are to provide

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Annex "A"

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APPENDIX "E" TO ANNEX "A"

LOGISTICS

1. Personnel - Of the 826 strength in the Brigade, only 18 are specifically designated for logistic tasks. These 18 are in the 85 man Brigade Headquarters.
2. The quantities of Class I, III, and V supplies are adequate for the operation.
3. The Brigade is without engineer or bridging capability.
4. Plans call for Class I, III, and V supplies to be mounted out from New Orleans, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. These supplies are available for both air and surface lift.
5. Transportation is adequate for the initial phases of the operation on an austere basis.

EVALUATION

6. Evaluation

a. Supply

(1) Adequate materials are available.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Organic medical capability is minimal. Brigade expects to be able to utilize civilian hospital facilities by D/1. This facility will provide adequate space and equipment. Plans are not clear as to control measures to be instituted for continued operation of hospital.

c. Transportation

(1) Organic transportation is expected to be augmented by civilian transportation on D/1.

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Annex "A"

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avgas to the airstrip. This being the case, no mogas capability exists other than drummed fuel dispensed with wabble pumps. The efficient operation of such a fuel point would require a lighting system, flood light trailer, and minimum of one crane.

(8) Plans for control and distribution of supplies in dump areas are sketchy.

(9) Inadequate repair and maintenance facilities for vehicles and tanks. No tank retriever. The 3000 gallon refuelers should be used to supply fuel to tanks and vehicles. Aviation refueling should be done outside objective areas.

(10) No plan evident for evacuation and repair of vehicles and equipment.

(11) No plan for safeguarding dumps from pilferage by indigenous personnel.

(12) Plans call for supplies to be preloaded in 3 embarkation areas: New Orleans, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. No member of the Brigade is conversant with the loading. Logistic personnel will become acquainted with the loading plans immediately prior to D-day while at sea. No TACLOG operations are contemplated. Under these circumstances, reliance on selective unloading of ships is hazardous.

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ANNEX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Friendly Forces

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a. A task force with an approximate strength of 1040 officers and enlisted men has been recruited, assembled and is now undergoing training. This task force consists of a ground force unit with an approximate strength of 826 personnel, a seaborne support element of approximately 40 individuals, and an air combat and support element with an approximate personnel strength of 100.

b. The ground force unit is organized along the lines of a U.S. Infantry Battalion and consists of one Headquarters and Support Company, four Rifle Companies, one Heavy Gun Company and one Tank (M41) Platoon. One Rifle Company has received airborne training, one Rifle Company has received training as motorized infantry to operate with the Tank Platoon, and three of the Rifle Companies are theoretically trained to engage in amphibious landings. To date, no actual training in amphibious landings has been accomplished by the Rifle Companies. Boat crews to operate the landing craft are currently undergoing training. M41 tank crews have not received sufficient training as yet; however, it is anticipated that adequate training will be provided within the United States. Eighty airborne trained personnel have received additional training as a special purpose unit, designed to parachute into general area of operation on D-Day to insure that strategic bridges are demolished and thereby denied to the enemy. (For further details on assault force, see Appendix "B" to Annex "A".)

c. Seaborne support unit has available a limited number of vessels and landing craft for training and for the conduct

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of its operational mission. (For further details, see 1
Appendix "B" to Annex "A".) A detachment of 11 personnel 2
is receiving specialized training in underwater operations 3
to qualify them to mark the channel of approach for landing 4
craft on D-Day. 5

d. The Air Force combat and support element has available 6
18 trained pilots within its total strength of 100. Aircraft 7
available and being used for training are: 17 D-26's, 8
10 C-54's, and 5 C-46's. 9

e. All of the above information was obtained by repre- 10
sentatives of the Joint Staff as a result of a briefing 11
held 31 January 1961. There is no indication that personnell 12
of the task force have received a combat type checklist 13
evaluation to determine its combat readiness. 14

2. Beachhead Area. The general objective area is isolated 15
from the location of Cuban Army units and is strategically 16
located so as to facilitate blocking rapid reinforcement by 17
cutting bridges on the two main roads and the railroad into 18
the area. The location of the area also facilitates expansion 19
of military and para-military operations. The selected beaches 20
for the amphibious assault are suitable for the landing 21
envisaged, provide adequate exits, and can be readily identified 22
from seaward. The airborne landing area is adequate for the 23
planned one company drop and is adjacent to the company's 24
objective area. Tanks can operate throughout most of the 25
beachhead area. Overall, the objective area is considered 26
desirable for the type operation envisaged. 27

3. Air Movement to the Port of Embarkation. The troops 28
that are to be moved amphibiously will be flown to Puerto 29
Cabezas during three consecutive nights prior to their departure 30

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for Cuba. This airlift is well within the capability of the 1
volunteer force. However, this traffic converging on Puerto 2
Cabezas, coming on the heels of recent construction there, might 4
alert Castro-Communist elements who could possibly observe the 4
loading of the troops on the LST's and report this information 5
to Cuba. To eliminate this possibility, other plans for moving 6
these troops to the LST's should be examined. For example: It 7
might be feasible to airlift these troops from Retalehuleu to 8
Swan Island for loading onto the LST's. This would reduce the 9
likelihood of being observed by Castro-Communist elements, and 10
would cut the time needed to move from the point of embarkation 11
to the invasion beaches by approximately one day. 12

4. Sea Movement 13

a. The plan requires that shipping be loaded at New Orleans, 14
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Vieques. Commencing at D-15, 15
shipping will load supplies at New Orleans and proceed in- 16
dependently to ports in Guatemala and Nicaragua. At the same 17
time, other ships of the invasion force will be loading per-18
sonnel and equipment at Vieques. All shipping, upon 19
completion of embarkation, will steam independently to a 20
rendezvous area off the Cayman Islands to arrive on D-1. Each 21
ship will travel on individual orders without knowledge of 22
the orders of other ships in the force. The result will be 23
dependent on the coordination and control exercised in the 24
execution of a detailed, exacting plan. Once in the rendez-25
vous area at the Cayman Islands, certain key personnel will 26
conduct pre-D-Day transfer among shipping. The final move- 27
ment into the objective area includes the rendezvous with 28
the invasion fleet of one U.S. Navy LSD. Final juncture of 29
shipping is effected at H-5 hours on D-Day off the invasion 30
beaches. 31

b. The complicated and multiple ship movements for the 32
14 days prior to D-Day will require plans in exact detail, 33
executed under centralized control and coordination. 34

5. Air Operations 35

a. Given the correctness of the current CIA estimate of 36
Cuban air defense capabilities, and assuming the air attack 37
will have the advantage of surprise, the D-1 and D-Day air 38
operations should be generally successful. 39

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Annex "B"

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b. However, if the CIA estimate is incorrect, and it develops that the Cubans possess jet aircraft and pilots and ground to air missiles, the air strikes could fail.

c. Furthermore, if the element of surprise is lost, the Cubans could utilize a few of their Sea Furys and B-26 aircraft airborne. The Cubans could also set sugar cane fires generating smoke that could frustrate at least some air strike missions, with the over-all effect that the D-1 and D-Day air operations would not accomplish all assigned missions.

6. Airborne Assault. The task force has adequate transport aircraft to lift the entire airborne infantry company to the landing zone within the beachhead. In view of the size of the drop zone, and its location in relation to the airborne company's objective, the airborne assault should be successful in seizing and holding the key terrain objective.

7. The Amphibious Assault

a. The amphibious element of the force has received no amphibious training and is not now scheduled to receive any prior to the operation. This deficiency will not be too serious if estimate of unopposed landing holds true. Nevertheless, lack of sufficient trained shore party personnel will complicate control in moving personnel and materiel across the beaches. Facilities for handling beached boats are not available. Trained personnel are not generally available for traffic control, beach installations, and control of dump sites.

b. Beaches are adequate to land personnel and equipment according to plan. Routes of egress restrict the landing of heavy vehicles to the beach on the right flank. Beaches are generally marked by significant terrain features. In

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addition, UDT trained personnel will be utilized to mark
the approaches to the principal beach on the right flank.

c. The amphibious assault does appear feasible, but there should be detailed plans to insure coordination of landing and effective handling of supplies and equipment across the beach and at least mockup training should be conducted.

d. The personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. This operation may be supported logistically on an austere basis during an unopposed landing. If opposition increases, the logistical aspects will rapidly worsen. Against moderate, determined resistance, this plan will fail to provide adequate logistic support.

8. Concept of Control of Beachhead Area

a. The concept of the invasion assigns the airborne company the mission of seizing the key hill mass which dominates the northern portion of the beachhead area and the town. One company lands amphibiously on the left flank beach, then proceeds to an objective area on the left flank which controls routes of ingress from the west. The first company to land amphibiously on the right flank beach clears the airfield, then moves to an objective area on the northeast portion of the beachhead area which controls the main highway and railroad from the east. The last company leaves one platoon on the right flank beach to assist in beach operations; the remainder of the company clears the port, then proceeds to an objective area on the eastern part of the beachhead area to control the unimproved roads in that area that lead to the east.

b. The units will maintain control by establishment of strong points, road blocks, and neutralization of avenues of

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approach. Patrols will be utilized to cover the principal routes leading into the beachhead area.

c. A major problem could arise in control of indigenous personnel. In this regard, desirability of control of radio and news media may be stressed. Provisions need be made for the prevention of sabotage, operation of port facilities, traffic control measures to restrict civilian movement in the beachhead area, care and control of POW's, and utilization of indigenous labor. Particular attention is required to restrict local civilian personnel from interfering with air operations at the air strip within the beachhead area. The question of local procurement of materiel on the local market may merit consideration. The plan is deficient in that it does not provide for these matters. It has been indicated that plans are being prepared which will take these problems into account. However, the size and composition of the force as it now stands is inadequate to fulfill the requirements described above.

d. The invasion force intends to establish contact with the guerrilla bands now operating in the general area of operations. According to currently available intelligence, it is estimated that within a 25 mile radius of the objective area, five guerrilla bands with a total estimated strength of 660 may cooperate with the task force. Another guerrilla band with an estimated strength of 90 is operating approximately 30 miles west of the objective area. Two additional guerrilla bands are operating some 40 miles north of the objective area. The concept is for these bands to reinforce the invasion force in the beachhead area. This part of the concept is not considered sound. It would appear that it would be desirable for the guerrilla bands now established within the area of operations to

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intensify operations and hold their current operating
 areas as a base to which the invasion force can withdraw
 if it is forced out of the beachhead.

9. Local Indigenous Support

a. Any invasion to overthrow the Castro regime would
 probably be supported by many segments of the population,
 especially if it showed some early success. Continued
 support of the invasion would depend largely on the
 identification of leaders with the hopes and aspirations of
 the bulk of the population. While some preliminary
 softening probably would be accepted as necessary for
 success of the operation, wholesale bombings would tend to
 unite the people behind Castro, especially if there was
 high loss of life as a result.

b. If the leaders of the movement can get their message
 across to the people rapidly and with a united voice,
 support probably will be forthcoming from all segments,
 including the armed forces and militia and widespread
 defections could be expected. However, a split in the
 leadership, or lack of a clear program appealing to the
 people, could well prevent any effective support developing.
 In the general area of operations, the loyalty of the
 militia and police units is probably divided between support
 for Castro and support for the anti-Castro guerrillas
 operating in the mountains. The militia units now engaged
 in counter-guerrilla operations were drawn from other
 provinces in order to assure their loyalty. Therefore,
 considerable local support for the invasion force can
 probably be expected. Likewise, if widespread support for
 the invasion force develops, it would reduce the militia
 units and rebel army elements available to oppose the
 landing force in subsequent operations.

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10. Resistance to Invasion and Time and Space Factors on
Cuban Army Reaction

a. The nearest Cuban Army Forces, approximately 100 miles away, are not normally concentrated but scattered throughout the area. Even if assembly of these forces commences on the evening of D-1, it is estimated that only a small element (approximately 1 battalion) could commence movement towards the area by the night of D-Day. Additional forces could begin departing for the area immediately thereafter as transportation becomes available. The initial elements of these forces could arrive in the area in about 8 hours, and could begin to probe the beachhead by D/1.

b. By U.S. combat standards without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, a force of approximate regimental size should be able to attack late on D/1. However, in view of the inexperience of the Cuban Army in this type of operation it is estimated that a force large enough to attack in strength could not be assembled in the beachhead area before D/2. The necessity to develop the location of the invasion force positions and prepare a coordinated attack would probably take an additional two days, although minor attacks or piecemeal attacks could occur between D/2 and D/4. If there is interference as planned from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, the mounting of a coordinated counterattack would be further delayed.

c. Without interference, tank units could reach the area from Santa Clara by road in approximately 8 hours and from Managua by rail and road in a maximum of 56 hours after starting to load.

d. Even if the invasion task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising

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JCSM-146-61

~~7~~ MAR 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S)

1. JCSM-57-61, dated 3 February 1961, which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan.
2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted.
3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto.
 - a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated.
 - b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since

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EVALUATION OF CIA TASK FORCE

THE PROBLEM

1. To inspect the Cuban Volunteer Force in order to evaluate its military effectiveness and determine the adequacy of its logistic support.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Approval of paragraph 1-p of JCSM 57-61, 3 February 1961 required an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and a detailed analysis of logistic plans.
3. The evaluation team left CONUS 24 February, spent two days in the training area, and returned to CONUS 27 February 1961.
4. For additional factors, see:
- a. Enclosure "A" for air factors.
 - b. Enclosure "B" for ground factors.
 - c. Enclosure "C" for logistic factors.

DISCUSSION

5. a. See Enclosure "A" for a discussion of the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.
- b. See Enclosure "B" for a discussion of the tactical training of the ground element and its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.
- c. See Enclosure "C" for a discussion of the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

CONCLUSIONS

6. By 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

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7. By 15 March 1961, the Ground element of the task force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit it to successfully carry out its mission.

8. The Cuban Volunteer force is not able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. There is a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with the present logistic organization.

9. The logistic organization is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. Assignment of a qualified military instructor for logistic training should increase the logistic capability to an acceptable minimum.

10. Surprise is essential to the success of the mission. However, odds against achieving surprise are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended that a decision to use this force against Castro be made at the earliest practicable date in order to permit final preparation and training to be initiated.

12. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

13. It is recommended that a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

AIR EVALUATOR - Lt Col B. W. Tarwater, USAP

GROUND EVALUATOR -

LOGISTIC EVALUATOR -

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "A"

EVALUATION OF AIR ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force. 1 2

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- 2. FACTS - The Cuban Volunteer Air Force has: 3
 - a. 16 B-26 pilots, 9 of these have between 1800 and 4 11,500 hours total flying time, with between 76 hours and 5 33 minutes, and 99 hours 25 minutes training in the B-26 6 at Retalhuleu. Each of those pilots has flown approxi- 7 mately 20 strafing sorties, fired 16, 5 inch rockets and 8 dropped 30 bombs - 15 skip and 15 glide. The other 7 B-26 9 pilots have between 1200 and 6000 hours total flying time, 10 with between 20 hours and 10 minutes, and 48 hours and 45 11 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these 12 seven pilots has flown approximately 5 strafing sorties, 13 fired 6, five inch rockets, and dropped 9 bombs - 3 skip 14 and 6 glide. 15
 - b. They have 16 navigator-co-pilots for the B-26s with 16 Loran and low level navigation qualifications. 17
 - c. They have 7 crews trained in the C-46, and eight 18 crews trained in the C-54. (A). 19
 - d. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 20 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions 21 over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all these 22 crews successfully reached the assigned drop zones. 23
 - e. Except for one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, 24

(3)

1 rocket firing, and bombing mission, evaluation of the
2 combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on second
3 hand reports.

4 f. All Americans and Cubans queried as to the opera-
5 tional effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was
6 definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

7 g. The Volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall
8 in-commission rate of approximately 92%.

9 h. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily
10 successfully preparing para-drops.

11 i. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully
12 arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket, and bombing
13 training.

14 j. There are adequate support personnel, aircraft, air-
15 craft, aircraft parts, P.O.L. and munitions on hand, on
16 the way, or on order, to permit mission accomplishment.

17 (See the Appendix for additional Facts Bearing on the
18 Problem.)

111

19 3. ASSUMPTIONS - on which CIA bases its current plan:
20 a. The air strikes will be conducted with the benefit
21 of surprise.

22 b. The combat aircraft of the Cuban Air Force will
23 probably be located on three, and not more than six air-
24 fields.

25 c. Intelligence estimates indicating very poor Cuban
26 air defense capabilities are accurate.

27 d. The anti-aircraft gunners will continue to be re-
28 quired to receive permission from their headquarters in
29 Havana before firing on unidentified aircraft.

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e. The B-26 missions will be flown from Puerto Cabezas. 1

4. ASSUMPTION - of the evaluator: 2

a. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation: 3

(1) Simulated strikes against an airfield with dispersed aircraft, and a maximum effort refueling and rearming exercise, will be conducted by the B-26 crews during the first week in March, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated. 4 5 6 7 8 9

(2) After the B-26s have moved to Puerto Cabezas nine B-26 will be simultaneously refueled and rearmed in minimum time, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated. 10 11 12 13

b. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation they will have adequate runway clearing equipment available during the air operation. 14 15 16

c. As indicated by personnel in charge, the operation will be conducted during the dry season, or a shelter will be built for the preparation and loading of the paratroops, and pierced steel planking will be provided to assure all weather parking for the aircraft. 17 18 19 20 21

DISCUSSION

5. Due to operational and scheduled training requirements it was impossible to observe the Volunteer Cuban Air Force in simulated tactical operations as requested. Consequently, with the exception of one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on an examination of personnel and training records, and conversations with 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all of these crews successfully reached their assigned drop zones.

h. Aircraft effectiveness can be most realistically evaluated when measured against the mission requirements.

The primary mission requirement of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force is the destruction of Castro's combat aircraft.

The airstrikes against these aircraft are being planned on the basis of the assumption that surprise will be achieved.

As a consequence, Castro's combat aircraft will remain based almost entirely upon three airfields, with possibly a few on three other airfields.

Furthermore, with the benefit of surprise the numerous anti-aircraft guns at these six airfields, and other primary targets, will not be used against the initial strike, since

Castro's anti-aircraft gunners are under orders not to fire on any aircraft without permission from their Headquarters in Havana.

The rest of the air mission includes air strikes against 4 communication centers, destruction of interdiction targets, and other targets that may develop just prior to or during the invasion.

Air drops and logistic support on an emergency basis will also be provided by the Volunteer Cuban Air Force.

1. In addition to the Cuban aircrews listed above, 6 American B-26 pilots, with between 3 to 6000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both, will be given refresher training in the B-26 and used in the initial air strikes.

One of the American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields on which Castro's combat aircraft are based.

7. On the basis of the factors listed above it is logical

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Cuban and American personnel.

6. In evaluating the military effectiveness of the aircrews the following factors were considered:

a. The pre-flight procedures, air work, gunnery, rocketry, bombing, and emergency procedures of the Cuban pilot, with whom the evaluator flew, were outstanding.

b. The Cuban pilots have much more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II.

c. Nine of the B-26 pilots have had between 76 and 100 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu; and the other seven B-26 pilots have received between 20 and 48 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery at Retalhuleu, and also have more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II; and henceforth the seven pilots with the least training will be given priority in B-26 training at Retalhuleu until their time in the B-26 equals that of the first nine B-26 pilots.

d. All of the sixteen B-26 navigator-co-pilots are former pilots and have received Lorán and low level navigation training at Retalhuleu.

e. The B-26 crews will participate in simulated tactical operations during the first week in March. Any weaknesses which may become apparent will be eliminated.

f. All Cubans and Americans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

g. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions

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1 to conclude that the aircrews of the Volunteer Air Force have
2 sufficient military effectiveness to achieve the mission re-
3 quirements.

4 8. Inasmuch as:

5 a. The volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall
6 in-commission rate of 92%.

7 b. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily
8 successfully preparing para-drops.

9 c. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully
10 arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket and bombing
training.

11 d. There are adequate personnel, aircraft, aircraft
12 parts, P.O.L., and munitions, on hand, enroute, or on
13 order to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix)
14 In view of the factors listed above, it is concluded that
15 the maintenance, armament, para-drop, and supply capability
16 of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force is adequate to promote
17 military effectiveness to the extent necessary for mission
18 accomplishment.

19 9. Based on an understanding of Castro's and the USSR's
20 vital concern in maintaining Castro in power, first hand
21 observations of security conditions at both Retalhuleu and
22 Puerto Cabezas, and conversations with people assigned at
23 both bases, it is concluded that the odds are about 85 to 15
24 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castro's
25 Cuba. If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that
26 the air mission will fail. As a consequence, one or more of
27 Castro's combat aircraft will likely be available for use
28 against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50

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caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force.

10. The reasons for believing that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved are as follows:

a. With a communist infiltrated town approximately one mile from the airfield, and a railroad on one side of the base and a highway on the other, and trees surrounding the entire base, all providing a constant opportunity for observation of activities at Retalhuleu, it is believed the Castro-communists will know when the main invasion force is airlifted from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas over a period of three nights.

b. The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is presently being developed as the primary strike base. A tent city has been erected off one end of the main runway with adequate facilities for approximately 160 men. Plastic bags are being filled with aviation gas and placed on parking areas off the main runway. The airfield, which is three miles from the town of Puerto Cabezas, has been placed off limits and is guarded by 60 of President Somoza's best troops, thereby alerting anyone interested that something unusual is happening at the airfield.

Furthermore, several commercial flights arrive daily on this same airstrip, and 50 Nicaraguans from the town of Puerto Cabezas are employed in readying the strike base; and of course they return to their homes in town each night. The docks from which the troops will move into ships for transport to Cuba are three miles from the airfield via a road which runs along the town. So again,

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1 in view of Castro-communist interest in maintaining Castro
2 in power, it seems likely that they are aware of the present
3 activities at Puerto Cabezas, and will know when the main
4 invasion force goes aboard the ships for their two day trip
5 to Cuba. Knowing this, it then becomes a not too difficult
6 submarine or air search problem, or both, to determine where
7 and when the force will land. Furthermore, once the main
8 force boards the ships, and it became obvious the force is
9 on its way, Castro's combat aircraft could be scattered
10 from the six primary airfields, and the anti-aircraft crews
11 alerted, and orders given to shoot unidentified aircraft on
12 sight. These two actions, as well as others that could be
13 taken, could create conditions beyond the military effective-
14 ness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This in turn could
15 lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion
16 force.

17 11. A cursory consideration of some of the major factors
18 concerned indicates that the troops of the invasion force
19 could be air rather than amphibious lifted. This would reduce
20 the time necessary to transport the invasion force from
21 Guatemala to Cuba from five days to one day - thereby in-
22 creasing the chances of achieving surprise by a factor of
23 five to one.

24 12. Consequently, its believed serious consideration should
25 be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather
26 than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it
27 might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

CONCLUSIONS

28 13. If the assumption of surprise is correct, and intel-
29 ligence estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are

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Enclosure "A"

1 correct, by 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements
2 of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate
3 military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air
4 mission.

5 14. The odds against achieving surprise however, are
6 believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would
7 likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness
8 of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This could lead to the
9 destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

11 15. It is recommended that serious consideration be given
12 to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than
13 continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might
be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

AIR EVALUATOR - Lt Col B. W. Tarwater, USAF

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ENCLOSURE "B"

EVALUATION OF GROUND ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE
THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the tactical training of the ground element of the task force and to estimate its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. For discussion, see Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. Based on observations and conversations with trainer personnel on the spot, it is believed that the ground element of this task force has been properly trained to successfully carry out its mission with the exceptions noted below.

5. Additional tactical training is required in defensive operations, coordination, preparation of defensive positions, and counter-attack. These matters are scheduled to be included in the future programmed training.

6. An early decision to proceed with this operation is imperative. The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable. In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that a decision to proceed with the operation be made at the earliest practicable date.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Length of service of personnel:
 - a. Varies - few days to 8 months.
 - b. Includes former members of the Cuban Constitutional Army, Rebel Army, militia, and personnel with no previous training.
2. Organization:
 - a. Brig. Hq. (116) and 4 rifle battalions (varies 109-162). T/O for each Bn 150. 1st Bn - parachutists. (145)
 - b. Hv. Gun Bn (104) incl. 4.2 mort., 75 mm recoilless rifles, (6-4.2 mort., 3 each RR).
 - c. Tank Bn (25) now training at Ft. Knox.
3. Training:
 - a. Guerrilla Opns - by civilian contract pers.
 - b. Basic military training - some by own personnel, remainder by Special Forces Teams.
 - c. 40 days at 16 hours per day supervised - additional on own time.
 - d. Airborne - Physical conditioning, 4 & 8 ft. platform, mock door, harness (chute) control, at least 3 jumps - jumpmaster at least 5 jumps.
 - e. Infiltration course - day and night - all pers.
 - f. Reaction course - all personnel.
 - g. Close combat, unarmed defense - all personnel.
 - h. Maps and compass - incl. night compass course.
 - i. Raids, ambushes, patrolling - day and night.
 - j. Weapons - familiarization firing on all weapons - cross training - field firing exercise.
 - k. Battalion and Brigade staff procedures and tactical operations including infantry - tank team theory, but no practical work - organization and conduct of the defense.
 1. Demolitions and field fortifications.

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- m. Bayonet training.
- n. Communications - nets and procedure.
- o. Approximately 25% of all training conducted at night.
- p. Physical conditioning stressed in all training.
- q. Forward air controllers trained to mark targets and call in air strike, communications adequate.
- r. Unit training through battalion (company) completed. Brigade (battalion) level training in progress. Will include simulated beach landings on terrain similar to objective area.
4. Observed Training:
- a. Brigade (battalion) in attack;
- (1) Included drop of parachute battalion (company) air support (2 B-26), simulated supporting fires by 4.2" and 81 mm mortar sections - blank ammo used.
- (2) Use of terrain - good - covered routes used.
- (3) Control - fair.
- (4) Leadership - good.-
- (5) Reorganization on objective - good.
- (6) Organization of position - good.
- b. Battalion (company) in attack;
- (1) Live ammunition used in pre-set problem.
- (2) Demolition charges used to simulate incoming fire.
- (3) Supporting weapons fired live overhead fire on objective.
- (4) Tactics were restricted due to nature of area.
- (5) Use of weapons - good to excellent.
- (6) Fire and maneuver - excellent.
- (7) Evacuation of casualties - good.
- (8) Control - excellent.
- (9) Physical fitness - superior.
- (10) Morale - superior.

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Appendix "A"

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c. Firing demonstration - Heavy Gun Dattalion;

(1) Included 4.2" mortars, 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal MG.

(2) Accuracy - excellent.

(3) Control - excellent.

(4) Condition of equipment - superior.

(5) Immediate action - excellent.

d. Individual Training;

(1) Mechanical training; cal 30 Light MG, M1917A1,

Reaction course, field demonstrations.

(2) Instructor personnel - good - used interpreters to communicate with trainees.

(3) Effectiveness of instruction - good - interest was high - almost all practical work.

5. Equipment:

a. There are no shortages of equipment which adversely effect training except proper maps of the local area.

b. Minor shortages in T/O&E are enroute to area and are arriving as rapidly as air lift permits.

c. Equipment is well cared for and when all enroute is received will be adequate for contemplated mission.

d. Communications equipment is partly military and partly commercial. These are 72 PRC-10's, 10 PE-33's, and 10 TP-1's used for tactical communications within the Brigade. Equipment is in excellent condition and all in working order. There is an adequate supply of batteries on hand.

e. Parachutes are repacked in the area by well qualified riggers. There have been no chute failures to date.

f. 5-M41 light tanks are at Ft. Knox where the tank unit is currently undergoing training. It was reported that driver training was completed and gunnery training was beginning.

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Appendix "A"

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6. Future Training Programmed:

a. Brigade exercises;

- (1) Brigade in attack - 2 ea of 2 days duration.
 - (2) Brigade in defense - 2 ea of 2 days duration.
 - (3) Simulated beach landing - 5 ea - 1 day exercises.
- b. Brigade march - 35 miles cross-country to beach and return - 2 days each way.
- c. Final shakedown, rehabilitation of equipment, repair and testing of weapons - 7 days.

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Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Individuals observed demonstrated a high degree of competence, considering the quality of personnel and the amount of time that they have been in training.
2. All personnel observed demonstrated excellent physical condition, high morale, and an apparent desire to get on with the job.
3. The leadership appears to be good. Leaders have been carefully selected and replaced when required by personnel who exhibited better potential than those originally selected. There have been very few leaders replaced in the course of the training. None of the leaders appears to harbor any personal political ambitions, nor a burning desire to make the service a career after the operation is completed.
4. All personnel can fire their weapons effectively, can and do maintain them properly, and are cross-trained on other weapons. Most of them have already fired more rounds than the average US soldier would fire in a two-year term of service.
5. The greatest problem facing the Brigade is the long confinement to the area which, while not now an immediate problem, could lead to a breakdown of discipline and control if prolonged or if the incentive which binds them together is removed.
6. Personnel appear eager to learn and it was reported that they devote long hours outside of training time to study and practice.
7. The quality of the personnel is amazing. College graduates with degrees in engineering are employed in the FDC as computers. All forward observers and their radio operators are qualified to adjust the fire of the mortars. Most of the personnel are young, generally from 18 to 31 years of age, and come from the middle class. There are a

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few older men in camp, but they are not favored and if they can't keep up are returned to Miami.

8. Security

a. Every effort has been made to keep this operation secret, but it is obvious that many people in the area are aware of what is going on. Although all troop movements are made at night, firing, explosions, aircraft orbiting over an objective area, parachute drops, and an abnormal number of unfamiliar aircraft in the area are a dead giveaway. A clandestine radio transmitter is known to be operating in the Retalhuleu area. The mayor of Retalhuleu is a card-carrying communist and lives about a mile from the airstrip. Leaflets have been circulated in Guatemala City by the Communist Party giving many of the details of the activity. Although there are some inaccuracies in this material, much of it is accurate. It can therefore be presumed that Castro knows practically all about the operation except when, where, and in what strength. //

b. There have been some cases of AWOL among the trainees. At the time of our visit, a group of eight including one company (platoon) commander was missing. On Saturday night, a group of 21 men left the camp and went into a small village nearby to attend a fiesta. By Sunday noon, 19 of this group had returned. Obviously, the presence of Cubans in fairly large groups is known to the people in the area. //

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ENCLOSURE C

EVALUATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE CIA TASK FORCE

1. THE PROBLEM

a. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission. 1 2 3

2. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation while conducting training operations. 4 5

b. There are no personnel in the training area either in the Special Forces instruction group or within the Cuban Volunteer Forces who are qualified to instruct in operational logistics. 6 7 8 9

c. Minimal training of Motor Transport drivers is being conducted due to political considerations. 10 11

d. No formal training in operational logistics is being conducted. 12 13

e. Aerial delivery equipment and capabilities are adequate for emergency air resupply requirements. 14 15

f. No significant shortages of equipment and material were evident. Items not in the training area were described by instructor personnel as being in the backlog of material in CONUS. There were no means by which the inspecting officer could verify this assertion. 16 17 18 19 20

3. DISCUSSION

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation. Supply operations within the bivouac area are satisfactory. Supply support from CONUS to the training area is by air. Recent inclement weather caused a backlog of supplies to build up in CONUS. Planes did not fly 21 22 23 24 25

1 to the training area for over one week. Airlift has been
2 resumed, however supplies delivered from backlog stocks
3 are not responsive to immediate needs. It appears that
4 planes are loaded with material available and receiving
5 units are unaware of items delivered until they open boxes
6 after delivery. No action was being taken to designate
7 priorities since all items were so considered. There was
8 a lack of logistic coordination in this instance.

9 b. Personnel are receiving limited logistic training
10 due to the on-the-job situation in bivouacs. Preparation
11 of meals, break-down and issue of supplies, and repair and
12 maintenance of equipment are being conducted in camp. No
13 training is being conducted in the amphibious aspects of
14 logistics. No shore party organization has been formed
15 nor is training being conducted in shore party operations.
16 No training is being conducted in the assault aspects of
17 logistics to include: establishment and operation of supply
18 points, inventory control, movement and distribution of
19 supplies to deployed units, or field messing operations.
20 The logistic concept of instructor personnel was that
21 tonnages of supplies could be deposited in the objective
22 area and units could help themselves to fulfill their
23 requirements.

24 c. The motor transport officer is receiving adequate
25 training in convoy and general operational procedures.
26 Local laws require that vehicles be operated by citizens
27 of that country or by instructor personnel. Cuban Volunteer
28 Force Motor Transport drivers receive no training in night
29 and blackout driving. Actual driver training is extremely

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1 limited. In view of the complicated process of backing
2 vehicles over sand and beach matting in to LCU's, this
3 deficiency is considered of major importance.

4 d. Facilities in the training area for the preparation
5 and packaging of supplies for air drop were inspected.
6 The capability is adequate for operations of an emergency
7 resupply nature. Delivery is limited to parachute delivery
8 or air landing of supplies.

9 e. The medical organization of the force is well or-
10 ganized and equipped. The planning and procedures to be
11 employed during the operation are simple, clear, concrete,
12 and appear to be understood by all personnel involved.
13 Equipment is adequate, clean, well cared for and properly
14 packed. Personnel appear competent and adequate.

15 f. Service functions are adequate. Enough trained
16 personnel are available to perform the second and limited
17 third echelon maintenance required. Tools and equipment
18 are adequate.

19 g. Clothing, weapons, individual, and organizational
20 equipment are in good condition and well cared for.
21 Vehicles utilized in the training area will be replaced
22 for the operation. Rough terrain and maximum utilization
23 have resulted in inordinate wear to tie-rods, springs, and
24 various organic parts of the vehicles. This is understand-
25 able since the vehicles are standard, commercial types and
26 are being utilized under field conditions.

27 h. Morale appears excellent. There was some indication
28 in remarks made by individuals that they were anxious to
29 enter the objective area. Instructors indicated anxiety

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over the fact that delay in definitely indicating D-day
would result in deterioration of morale. Many troops
have been confined within the camp area on a rigorous
training schedule for six months or more and are living
under austere conditions. Their primary incentive is the
prospect of moving to the objective area.

1. A decision as to whether or not the operation will
take place is necessary in the near future due to the im-
pending rainy season. It is considered that operations
during the rainy season would present unsurmountable
difficulties in view of the limited equipment available.
Logistic requirements for the shipment of supplies by
railroad to POE; loading and sailing time for ships; etc.,
necessitate approximately a three-week leadtime. The
estimation of time involved was provided by CIA since
they are handling shipping arrangements.

4. CONCLUSIONS

- a. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not presently able to
sustain itself logistically for an extended operation.
It has a marginal capability of operating for a period of
thirty days with its present logistic organization.
- b. The logistic organization within the Cuban Volunteer
Force is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor ade-
quately trained. It needs emphasis to provide a cohesive,
effective logistic support capability.
- c. It is imperative that an instructor experienced in
operational logistics be provided to the training unit at
the earliest practicable date.
- d. An organized shore party unit needs to be formed and
trained as soon as possible.
- e. More vigorous action is needed in training motor
transport drivers to handle vehicles. This could be

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Enclosure C

partially accomplished by night operations within the camp
areas. 1 2

f. The Cuban Volunteer Force is adequately supported
medically for operational functions well in excess of 30
days. 3 4 5

g. The service capabilities of the Cuban Volunteer
Force are adequate for the operation. 6 7

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED

a. That a military instructor experienced in operational
logistics be assigned to the training unit as soon as
practicable. 8 9 10

LOGISTIC EVALUATOR -

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CIA Dissel
memo

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PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans

to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be

1. Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the Agency was accomplished shortly. ~~What is emerging from these negotiations is a~~ directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers, very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment of disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows: recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

a. Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democrático), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Castro, approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more

has proved to be highly useful. ~~infantry company to be used primarily for logistic~~ but important political elements refused to join it. purposes and as a reserve.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary

the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment

Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal of the battalion.

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(3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C54s and 5 C-46s.

(4) Shipping including 2,100-ton ships, 5,1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCU's and 4 LCVP's.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem.

The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time is against us. The

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Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is

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making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action

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involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

- a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.
- b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with/tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.
- c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragraph 3.B. above.
- d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength.

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4. Coveit Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.

a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.)

b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualties could not be evacuated.

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c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.

5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.

a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the

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contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force.

b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock.

c. If this operation were not successful in setting off widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U. S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U. S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i. e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizeable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime.

6. A Diversionary Landing: As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding.

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a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.

b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U. S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

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a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually unopposed. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault,

b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a useable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up. 22 67

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three.

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8. Conclusions:

- a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight.
In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.
- b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.
- c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba.
- d. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

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Rejected by 7
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JCSM-166-61
15 MAR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate
Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of three alternate concepts for the CIA Para-Military plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro Government. The military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba", dated 3 February 1961, and the evaluation of the proposed supplementary phase to the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-149-61, subject: "Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba", dated 10 March 1961.

2. The following CIA alternate concepts of operations were evaluated:

- a. Alternative I - Original para-military plan, except main landings at night, without benefit of airborne landing or air strikes. See Appendix A hereto for details and evaluation.
- b. Alternative II - At an objective area on NE coast, employment of airborne company at evening nautical twilight to seize key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into objective area to isolate same; this followed by night debarkation of remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from airstrip within objective area following day. See Appendix B hereto for details and evaluation.

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c. Alternative III - As an objective area on the southern coast, amphibious landing of two infantry companies after dark to seize key areas; during the night, land remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from the airstrips the following day. See Appendix C hereto for details and evaluation.

3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

a. Alternative I - Without the psychological impact of the original concept, together with the difficulties of landing at night in this area and the lack of ability to initiate air operations, the ultimate success of Alternative I is doubtful.

b. Alternative II - Even though the Cuban Volunteer Force could be landed and sustained for a minimum of 3 days, the distance from the seat of government, together with the problem of continuous resupply over long distances, causes this course of action to be least likely to accomplish the objective.

c. Alternative III has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace.

d. Of the alternative concepts, Alternative III is considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective.

e. None of the alternative concepts are considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the basic para-military plan.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions.

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b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the Appendices hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (10 pages)
7 copies of Appendices

APPENDIX A

EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ORIGINAL CIA PARAMILITARY PLAN FOR CUBA; WITH THE CHANGES THAT THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING WILL BE MADE AT NIGHT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT, OR AIR STRIKES

- 1 The concept of the plan is as follows: Following a
2 deception landing on the night of D-1 the Task Force,
3 accompanied by provisional Government representation, will
4 invade at night by amphibious landing on the selected beaches.
5 The force will immediately move around the city to occupy
6 the high ground which dominates the objective area. At dawn
7 control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing
8 and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the
9 perimeter which dominates entrance routes into the area.
10 Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in the Generallo
11 area of operations. The small airstrip will be cleared.
12 Every effort will be made to increase the force by local
13 volunteers for which arms will be provided. The force will
14 establish control within the beachhead area and if driven
15 therefrom, will be prepared to withdraw and link with guerrilla
16 forces to continue guerrilla activities.
17
18 2. The enemy forces, terrain, beaches, man-made installa-
19 tions and populace, remain the same as set forth in the
20 original plan; the time and space factors remain the same with
21 the exceptions that:
22 a. The amphibious landing will be made at night;
23 b. Immediately upon landing, the force will move around
24 the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the
25 city. Then at dawn they will move out to seize and
26 organize the strong points on key terrain as originally
27 planned;
28 c. The airborne assault and the air strikes will
29 not be conducted.

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Appendix A

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3. a. Advantages

(1) The force will move ashore at night, increasing the possibility of achieving tactical surprise.
(2) The landing will be near a mountainous region in the event the force is unable to maintain its lodgment, and it becomes necessary to move out of the beachhead area and conduct guerrilla operations.
(3) The landing area is relatively near the seat of government, thereby making it potentially possible to move upon the ultimate objective area in a relatively short period of time.

(4) Large numbers of the populace in the landing area are believed to be antagonistic to Castro's regime.

(5) The beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the Tank Force mission.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) The airstrip is inadequate for B-26 operations.
(2) Without benefit of air operations, elements of Castro's Air Force would be available for use against the force. These aircraft could make it impossible for the force to hold a lodgment in the beachhead area, or virtually any fixed or exposed position, thereby forcing the volunteers to move into the mountains as a guerrilla force almost immediately.
(3) It will be difficult for a force inexperienced in amphibious operations to locate and use the narrow landing beaches at night.

4. Conclusions:

- 1 a. Despite the disadvantages enumerated above, this
2 concept would provide a fair chance of success in landing
3 and seizing initial objectives.
- 4 b. The lack of air support and the difficulties
5 of supply at night, or under possible air attack if
6 attempted in daylight, indicate small chance of
7 ultimate success for this concept.

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APPENDIX B

CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL TO LAND ON THE EASTERN END OF THE ISLAND TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES OF THE CIA PANAMA-MILITARY PLAN, CUEA

1. The concept of operation for landing on the Eastern
end of the Island envisages the employment of an airborne
company to land during the hours of darkness on D-Day to
seize a landing pier in the area together with key terrain
features astride two separate roads leading into the area.
During the night of D-Day, ships transporting the remainder
of the Cuban Volunteer Task Force will dock alongside the
landing pier, discharge the personnel and supplies and
depart the area prior to daylight. Units of the Task Force
will proceed inland, seize an airfield, other strategic
terrain features, and establish contact with the Airborne
Company to assure protection of the judgment area.
2. One company of the Cuban military forces is located in
the objective area and probably patrols the area. The
closest known Cuban Army units which could be used as re-
inforcements are, one Infantry Battalion and one Field
Artillery Battalion located 35 miles away. These units
probably could not be assembled and moved to the area in
less than 24 hours due to limited transportation available
and condition of the roads over which they must travel.
3. The objective area consists of rolling terrain adjacent
to the shoreline and backed by swamp lands which extend in-
land. The terrain features and vegetation can provide ade-
quate protection and concealment for the landing force.
Water approaches to the landing pier are protected from the

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1 open sea by extensions of land on either side and depth of
2 water will accept all shipping available to the Task Force.
3 However, negotiation of the channels at night will be
4 difficult.

5 a. There are two improved roads leading into the area;
6 however, connection between them consists of unimproved
7 roads and trails. Absence of a well developed road net
8 combined with the swampy terrain will hamper movement of
9 large military forces.

10 b. An airfield is located 1.5 miles Southeast of the
11 proposed landing area. Its description is as follows:
12 Runway dimensions 4000'x120'
13 Surface construction is asphalt and oiled
14 sand.

15 The field will accept C-47 type aircraft
16 Runway extensibility, 11,000 ft.
17 Operations capabilities are negligible
18 and the field can only be classified as
19 a good all-weather emergency strip.

20 c. Adjacent to the landing pier is a village with
21 approximate population of 18,000. The rural area
22 adjacent thereto is underdeveloped and sparsely populated.
23 Attitude of the local populace toward the Castro Govern-
24 ment is not known, however, due to the remoteness of the
25 area, it may be assumed that a neutral attitude would
26 prevail during the initial phases of the operation.

4. Conclusions

27 a. The selected objective area, drop zones and landing
28 piers are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation.

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Appendix B

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b. The known or expected location of Cuban Military
Forces indicated that complete surprise may not be
attained.

c. Operational capabilities of the airfield in the
area are negligible and can be classified as only a Good
all weather emergency strip.

d. Given the opportunity to seize its proposed ob-
jectives, the Task Force will have the capability to
sustain itself without resupply for a minimum of 3 days.

e. A landing in this area would be so far removed
from the seat of Government it is doubtful that the
desired psychological effect on the Cuban people would
be attained.

f. If the Task Force is required to abandon its
primary mission, evacuation by sea could probably be
accomplished or elements of the force could continue
to operate as guerrilla units in the area. The mountainous
area approximately 10 miles inland is considered suitable
for guerrilla operations.

g. This operation would be difficult to support from
a logistic standpoint.

h. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages of this
proposed course of action.

Appendix B

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APPENDIX C

CONCEPT OF AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL TO LAND
ON AN OBJECTIVE AREA ON THE SOUTHERN COAST

1. Concept: Under cover of darkness, two companies will land over the two beaches at the head of the bay, rapidly move inland, seize their assigned objectives, and prepare to defend them. A small combat outpost will be landed on the east side of the entrance to the bay to provide warning and block the coast road from the east. A combat outpost will be established to close the road across the swamp to the west of the landing beaches. The remaining four companies will be landed prior to dawn and will proceed to their assigned objectives. All boats will withdraw to sea and be clear of the area prior to daylight. At daylight, B-26 aircraft will land on the seized airfield or airfields and conduct air operations from these locations immediately thereafter.
2. Enemy Forces: There are no known enemy forces in the objective area, although it is probable that militia patrols maintain surveillance over the coast road. The nearest concentration of Cuban Rebel Army forces are located at Managua, near Havana, and at Santa Clara. Rural police posts are located in the villages and towns, but their capability is limited to employment in small groups using small arms. The nearest sizable militia unit is located at Cienfuegos, but there may be smaller militia elements as close as ten miles from the landing beaches.
3. Terrain: The terrain in the objective area is flat, swamp land covered with a dense growth of mangrove, except for a strip east of the landing beaches. This strip rises from 5 to 30 feet above mean sea level and is covered with scrub growth and high savanna grass. Entry into and exit from the

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Appendix C

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area is confined to the established roads and a single track
narrow gauge railroad bed. Trafficability off roads is poor
except that foot troops may move with difficulty. There
are approximately seven possible exits from the area to the
north and west.

4. Beaches: The bay has a number of usable beaches located
along the east shore, but the best are at the head of the
bay. The two beaches selected are each approximately 400
yards long and have easy exits to the coast road which skirts
the bay. Seaward approaches are clear and deep water extends
to within a few yards of the shore. Beach gradients from
available photography appear to be suitable for dry-ramp
landings of personnel and light vehicles.

5. Man-Made Installations: There are two airfields in
the area, one firmly packed sod strip, carried as approximately
4000 feet long and the other a newly constructed packed coral
and sand strip approximately 6000 feet long. Recently it
has been reported that the sod strip is being lengthened to
over 6000 feet. Both strips are currently in various stages
of construction. There has been considerable road building
noted in this area in the past year. The coast road has been
widened and resurfaced with a concrete surface. A new road
has been constructed across the eastern portion of the swamp,
but this road has not yet intersected the coast road. There
are no roads to the west.

6. Attitude of Populace: The objective area is very
sparsely settled with no towns or villages of any size. A
few scattered houses, not closely grouped, comprise the only
habitations in the area. The attitude of the populace vis-a-
vis Castro is unknown.

7. Time and Space Factors: Due to the sparse population,
tele-communications in the area are probably poor or non-
existent. The area has been an historically suitable guerrilla

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1 area. Reaction time for the Cuban Rebel Armed Forces is
 2 probably greater than elsewhere on the island due to the
 3 distance to be covered, the nature of the terrain, and the
 4 relatively poor road net. However, the area is within range
 5 of suitable positions for Cuban heavy artillery (122 mm Gun).
 6 Observation of fire would be restricted to aerial observation
 7 by aircraft.

8. Advantages and Disadvantages:

a. Advantages

- 10 (1) Two probably usable airfields are in the area.
- 11 (2) A remote and inaccessible area making reaction
 12 against the invasion force slow and difficult.
- 13 (3) No known Cuban armed forces in the area.
- 14 (4) Swampy terrain would prevent the use of armor
 15 against the invasion force except tank gun fire.
- 16 (5) Defectors could join the invasion force,
 17 however with difficulty. A small band (approximately
 18 100) of Guerrillas are close to the area.
- 19 (6) Surprise could probably be achieved if
 20 operation was carefully timed.
- 21 (7) Relatively close to the seat of Government for
 22 the resulting psychological effect on the Cuban
 23 people.

b. Disadvantages

- 24 (1) Resupply, including food, must come from outside
 25 Cuba.
- 26 (2) Exits from objective area could be sealed off
 27 and prevent expansion of operations.
- 28 (3) Firm ground in area is within range of suitable
 29 heavy artillery positions.
- 30 (4) No sizable immediate help could be expected
 31 from the local populace.
- 32

Appendix C

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1 (5) No civilian hospital facilities available.

2 (6) All supply must be across the beach.

3 9. Conclusions:

4 a. In the absence of significant enemy forces in the
5 area, the invasion force can be landed successfully
6 in the objective area and can be sustained in the area
7 provided resupply of essential items is accomplished.

8 b. The area meets the requirements, imposed including
9 the availability of an airfield, suitability for a
10 clandestine landing, and possibly suitable for extending
11 operations to cause the downfall of Castro.

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Appendix C

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(Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.

(Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition.

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1 or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could
2 eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the
3 time this would require is possible.

4 11. Political-Military Considerations

5 a. When this plan was originally briefed to the Joint
6 Staff in outline form the impression was gained that the
7 force would occupy a small perimeter in the mountains
8 where it could fairly easily be surrounded and destroyed.
9 If such an event should appear imminent after declaration
10 of a provisional government and U.S. recognition, U.S.
11 overt support would have to be given to uphold U.S. prestige
12 regardless of the international consequences. The detailed
13 explanation of the plan now reveals that if the beachhead
14 area cannot be held, the force together with leaders of
15 the provisional government will withdraw into the mountains
16 and join existing guerrilla bands. In this eventuality,
17 the invasion force will not have completely failed in its
18 mission, and the U.S. would not necessarily be committed
19 to overt support. Therefore, a decision to commit this
20 force would not necessarily require a simultaneous decision
21 for overt U.S. military action.

22 b. If the United States had not recognized the provisional
23 government prior to abandonment of the beachhead, subsequent
24 U.S. actions could be in the form of continued covert
25 support of a guerrilla movement. If the United States
26 had recognized the provisional government, prior to
27 abandonment of the beachhead, then a decision as to whether
28 U.S. prestige would require overt support would be required.
29 This eventuality should be considered at the time the
30 basic decision to execute the plan is made.

31 c. The present plan does not allow for the possibility
32 of follow-up support from other Latin American countries

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Annex "B"

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in subsequent phases of the operation. Such support would
increase the capabilities of the military force and, it
is estimated, would intensify local Cuban support. The
introduction of such forces would create problems of supply,
command, prestige, etc. which would be solvable, but
which would have to be anticipated and included in prior
planning. Therefore, a decision as to possible OAS support
should be sought without delay.

12. Ability to Accomplish Mission

a. The following are factors favorable to the invasion
force:

- (1) Probably unopposed landing.
- (2) Probable lack of air opposition.
- (3) Availability of friendly air support.
- (4) Suitability of terrain for fixed defense.
- (5) Remoteness of beachhead area.
- (6) Assistance from guerrillas.
- (7) High motivation and morale.

b. Following are factors unfavorable to the invasion
force:

- (1) Lack of reserves.
- (2) Lack of logistic support elements.
- (3) Lack of freedom of maneuver.

c. Following are unknown factors:

- (1) Degree of popular support.
- (2) Capabilities of Cuban Army to successfully
counterattack.

d. Considering the above factors, on balance the
invasion force should be able to accomplish objectives
as stated in paragraph 2a and c. Since objective stated
in paragraph 2b is dependent on degree of popular support

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1 and success of the political, psychological part of this

2 plan rather than on purely military factors, success of

3 this part of the mission cannot be definitely assured,

4 but is estimated has a fair chance of success.

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APPENDIX C TO ANNEX "A"

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua

1. Movement from the Training Area - The Airborne Company will be moved to a training area so that they will be unaware of the movement of the remainder of the force. At time of loading onto the two LST type vessels, the remaining troops will be moved by air over a period of three nights to Puerto Cabezas and moved directly aboard ships at the docks adjacent to the airfield. The airborne company will be loaded aboard the transport aircraft the night of D-1 Day at the airfield at Retalhuleu, Guatemala.

2. Movement of Surface Vessels - Both LST's load initial supplies at New Orleans commencing on D-18. Depart for Puerto Cabezas on D-16 and D-11 respectively. The two LCI's arrive Vieques on D-15, load crews of the LCU's, LCUP's, tanks and UDT personnel and depart on D-5 to Ft #1, Cayman Islands (1091 mi.). The two LST's arrive at Puerto Cabeza on D-8 and D-7 respectively and depart on D-3 to Ft #1 (542 mi.). All shipping, except the LSD, rendezvous at Ft #1 (Cayman Islands), 138 mi. from the beachhead area on D-1. The sea group rendezvous with the LSD at Ft #2, 10 mi. from beachhead area at H-5 on D-Day.

3. D-1 Day Operations - Air strikes will be conducted, commencing early morning, by 12 B-26's against targets in the following priority: Cuban aircraft on the airfields, Cuban naval patrol vessels, key communication facilities (3 micro), naval installations, tank and artillery parks at Managua, then the highway and railroad bridges outside the beachhead area as well as other key bridges in Cuba.

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Appendix "C" to Annex "A"

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Approximately 2000 on D-1 Day, a deception landing will be staged off the Northwest coast of Cuba by two craft equipped with Beach Jumper type equipment.

During the evening, teams will be parachuted to the three key bridges outside the beachhead area to destroy them if the air strikes had failed the previous afternoon.

4. D-Day - The surface shipping proceeds to transport area off the beaches to arrive prior to dawn. CIA personnel will drive the LCU's and LCVP's from the LSD (which will withdraw immediately) then deliver them to the Cuban personnel from the LCI's. Troops will be transferred to the landing craft.

Just prior to dawn the B-26's will conduct operations against the beaches and the airborne landing zone.

At dawn, the task force will invade by simultaneous air drop and amphibious landing on the East and West beaches. Avoiding the city, control of the beachhead will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain, along the perimeter, which dominate the city and entrance routes into the beachhead area. The small air strip will be cleared and supplies moved over the beach by one platoon remaining at the beach, plus headquarters personnel and impressed labor. The timing calls for control of the beachhead by the night of D-Day.

5. The concept envisions the joining of local volunteers and eventual tie-in with guerrilla forces currently operating within 25 miles of the beachhead. The initial logistics lift includes paramilitary packs for the equipping of 1500 volunteers.

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6. The force will defend the beachhead and if driven there-
from it will be prepared to withdraw from the beachhead, link
up with current guerrilla groups and continue guerrilla opera-
tions.

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Appendix C to
Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "D" TO ANNEX "A"

AIR CAPABILITIES

1. On D-1 the volunteer air force will utilize 14 of their 17 B-26 aircraft. They will have 6 U. S. and 12 Cuban B-26 pilots to utilize. Six of the Cuban pilots are presently more proficient in dive and skip bombing and strafing than their U. S. instructors. //

2. Their primary target will be the Cuban Air Force which they will attempt to destroy on the ground in the first strikes. These strikes will be conducted simultaneously, and directed primarily against 6 airfields which are the only ones on which aircraft having any combat potential are presently based. An American pilot will be used in the strike force against each base. Each of the aircraft used against the bases will be armed with 2-750 lb. napalm bombs; 16-220 lb. fragmentary bombs; plus 6-50 cal. machine guns and 2400 rounds of 50 cal ammunition. Target folders have been prepared for the airfields and weather information will be provided by Omaha Weather Central which has proven itself 85-93% accurate in its forecasts. (11)

3. On D-1 the volunteer air force will also strike Castro's 3 micro-wave communication centers, naval units, interdiction targets in the landing area, and other selected targets. On D-Day they will primarily support the landings by strafing the beaches, attacking bridges, and striking any navy or air units that may have been missed on D-1. Each of the 14 B-26 aircraft is expected to make two strikes against Cuba on D-1 and D-Day. Their flights will all originate from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua.

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Appendix "D" to
Annex "A"

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Flight time between Puerto Cabezas and Cuba is approximately 2 hours 20 minutes each way, and when aircraft make more than one strike a day against Cuba, it will take about two hours on the ground at Puerto Cabezas for rearming and refueling. Aircraft carrying napalm will be able to stay in the target area approximately twenty minutes with a one hour fuel reserve. Aircraft not carrying napalm will have pylon tanks enabling them to stay in the target area approximately two hours with one hour fuel reserve.

4. In addition to the B-26 aircraft the volunteer force will have 5 C-46 aircraft, and 10, C-54 aircraft available for logistic and transport purposes. These cargo aircraft will operate from Retalhuleu in Guatemala, and Puerto Cabezas. The cargo aircraft have adequate range capabilities to perform any missions required by the operation.

5. The volunteer air force has adequate fuels, ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance personnel available for the operation, for example, 150,000 gals. of aviation gasoline; 2000 five inch rockets; 16 spare engines; 30-40 U.S. maintenance specialists plus 12 Cubans.

6. Castro's Air Force has approximately 17 B-26 aircraft (with only 4 in commission; they have 15 "Sea Fury" piston fighters with approximately 3 in commission. They have approximately 20-25 pilots of fair capability available to fly these aircraft. However, its reported that 100 Cuban pilots are being trained in communist countries. The Cuban air force has 15 airfields suitable for handling jet aircraft. However,

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Appendix "D" to Annex "A"

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the aircraft presently in the Cuban inventory having a potential combat capability are based on only six of these airfields.

7. There is no firm evidence that the Cubans have an effective radar or anti-aircraft capability. This is attested to by the fact that approximately twenty air missions have been conducted over Cuba in the past few months without interception nor attack by other than random small arms fire.

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Appendix "D" to Annex "A"

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no alternate strip is available. Also, if only one Cuban combat plane escapes destruction and interdicts the field, the operation would be seriously handicapped. Therefore, it is not believed that the increased surprise achieved outweighs the risk of possible failure.

4. Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces, and an analysis of the logistics plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 above.

b. A decision with respect to the employment of this tank force be made at the earliest practicable date in order to initiate final preparation and training.

c. A military instructor, experienced in operational logistics, be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

d. The views expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and the recommendation contained in subparagraph c above, be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the report in the Appendix hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachments

5 copies of Appendix

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JCSM-146-61

~~14 MAR 1961~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S)

1. JCSM-57-61, dated 3 February 1961, which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan.

2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted.

3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto.

a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated.

b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since

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31 May 1961

SUBJECT: Report from Wounded Man Evacuated from Playa Giron Airstrip by C-46.

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 14 May 1961.

1. The wounded man, ^{eva-}cuated from the airstrip by C-46 at 0530 local 19 April carried no written report from the Brigade Commander.
2. The foregoing was verified on 24 May 1961 through discussion with _____, who would have been the recipient of a written report had such existed. Additionally, a discussion with ROBERTO PEREZ SAN ROMAN, brother of the Brigade Commander and himself the Commander of the Heavy Gun Battalion, indicated that although the Brigade Commander was writing a report, it was not complete and did not leave with the man evacuated from Blue Beach. It was intended that it be transmitted via a subsequent flight which, of course, did not occur.
3. An attempt was made to debrief pilot _____ on his return from Blue Beach. He was slightly wounded, but physically exhausted from lack of food and sleep and emotionally shaken by the events which had transpired. _____ indicates that subject frequently lapsed into Spanish.
4. A recording was made of the remarks of pilot _____ which was subsequently returned to Headquarters. A transcription has been made of this tape at Headquarters, and the result is attached herewith. This tape was made within two hours of the pilot's return from Blue Beach.

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Statement of

I am the pilot of the B-26 W915 that was shot down on the morning of the 17th at 10:30 in the morning. I take off from (garbled) base at about 4:00 in the morning. Supposed I am to go to Red Beach to try to support our infantry men that was taking care of the beach. About 7:00 in the morning I was over the beach with another B-26, (name garbled) was the other pilot. About 7:30 we received a message from one that was from our Chief that say that Castro fighters was hitting our ship. We go over there. I saw (name garbled) was fighting with one Sea Fury No. 545. I go in against the Fury, too, and we go (garbled phrase) but the Fury left and return to Havana Airport. Later on we come back to the Red Beach again and then I saw one T33 and one B-26 hitting our ships. Mr. (name garbled) left already because he have very low fuel and I stay along over our Red Beach and Blue Beach. About 8:00 I saw a 33 and a 26 flying over our ship. Hit him with a rocket and a machine gun. I go in the tail of the 26 and I shoot him down. The 26's number 903. It was about 9:00. He hit already in the Cochinos Bay. Both pilot was dead because they cannot make a parachute jump. About 5 minutes later after I shot down the 26 I saw one 33 that come in from about 10,000 to 12,000 feet over my head. Made a dive and he hit me with a 50 caliber machine gun. My right engine was put out and I got the smoke in my cockpit. I try to come back to our field in Blue Beach. I try to make a landing over there and when I come in there to make a pass the 33 made another pass over my aircraft so I lost all my control. I got smoke, flame, and my left engine was black with smoke. I try to come in final but I haven't any control in the aircraft so we hit the left side of the runway more than 140 miles per hour without any control. The aircraft was exploding already and when I opened my eyes I was more than three hours in the hospital. My co-pilot was already dead. My co-pilot name was Lt. (garbled) (garbled), he is already dead. Dr. (name garbled) was the Cuban doctor that was taking care of us here at the hospital told me that some guy that belonged to our country picked me up about 20 feet of my aircraft. I was almost burning up from the flame and they sent me to the hospital. After it was about 3 hours, about 3:00 in the afternoon,

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I (garble) out because they gave me some shots, some morphine. And then I go to the Headquarters of our Commander in the Beach. Over there, I saw, it was about 4:30, one was our B-26. It was shooting down the T35. Our 26 made a pass against the militia troops and dropped his bomb. Later on when he returned to the beach, and tried to make another pass, the 33 come in and he stay and our 26 exploding already over the Blue Beach about 2 miles to the coast. This night, all the whole day Monday the Castro aircraft made about 10 rides over our troops. Between 7:00 in the morning to 6:00 in the afternoon all the day 3 T-birds and 2 B-26 and one Fury was flying over our heads all day. Later on about 6:00 the Castro aircraft leave already, but they send 30 tanks on the Red Beach headquarters, and 30 from the east side of the Cienfuegos highway. So we can't move because we have 30 tanks in the left, 30 tanks on the right. Our troops began to make a retreat back because they was about between 9,000 to 11,000 and we was only about 1,000 men. I talked with the Navy chief, because I was in with the headquarters commander about 6:30 and we say that we can hold if the Navy can make any neutralization of the Castro air force. They say that we need to hold our position, they are over here and we are over there so we hold our position. The second day in the morning the Castro aircraft come in at 6:30 in the morning and begin again a raid on our troops. We lost in the first raid 42 men. These 42 men, 25 was lost shooting at the Castro air force. At 6:30 the second day between 6:00 to 6:30 begin the second ride. The second day was Tuesday and continue all the way. Our troops continue to make a retreat because they come in too much. They come in with about 9,000 to 11,000 men. And Mr. Pepe San Roman, that was the chief of our troops, talking again with the Navy and say that we need to deter the Castro aircraft or we are lost already. The Navy said that they would send over there some aircraft and about 5:00 this afternoon I saw 3 Navy aircraft fly in formation over the Blue Beach. They made three passes and go away to the ship. Five minutes later the Castro aircraft come in and make another raid over our people. That night the Castro men continue the advance over our troops. We can't make too much because we are very low in parts, we don't have 50 caliber, and we don't have too many bazooka

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grenades--we are very short in ammunition. So we continue to retreat. That night I personally was taking care of our airport, I personally shot two militia who try to make a penetration of the airport. One of them got a 38 (garble) and the other got a Czech machine gun. One of them said he got a Communist card that say that he belong to the Socialist Party. In Cuba we call this Communist. The other was a Militia. About 8:00 in the night I was talking again with our chief, that was Pepe San Roman, and he told me that our aviation can't mean anything to our troops, the Castro headquarters commander was in Red Beach, we can't hold 48 hours. We send a message to the ship that our aviation 26 may arrive this afternoon. This morning the 26 would try to make a raid in the Red Beach. I saw about 4:00 about 3 of our B-26 made a drop--a bomb-- over Red Beach. But about 20 minutes later I saw one T33 was shooting down our B-26 near Blue Beach about 6:30 to 7:00 on my watch over there. I saw they was shooting down so Pepe San Roman told me again that we can't send any more B-26 because they will shoot down all that we send. He told me what we call again to the Navy and say that send quickly the (garble) and the (garble) and everything they got over there because in another minute, we can't hold more than 24 hours. We are continuing to run out of ammunition. We don't have anything that the doctor can take care of the guys that was shot, we don't have any bandages, we don't have anything. My personal flight suit was taken by Dr. (name garbled) to try to make some bandage, because they don't have anything over there to fix the guys that were shot. About 6:30 in the morning one of our aircraft that was flown by Captain (name garbled) was landing at our airport. He picked me up. Five minutes before I was talking with San Roman give me all the map and all the positions and he say to me to tell to come in quick with the air force because in another minute we can't hold 24 hours. Tell him he need to retrieve Red Beach and Central Covodonga. They have more than 9,000 Militia. Tell that through Red Beach and Covodonga we gain the war in three days, so they can't say anything more against us. But tell him too that if he don't come quickly we are already lost. Five minutes later I made it from the aircraft, so I don't know what happened. I had seen the retreat before, because it was the second day there. I was

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over there about 4:30 to 5:00 I saw six B-26 made a raid on the highway going from the Blue to the Red Beach over there. They made a nice pass and I seen that they killed more than 200 Militia and destroyed two tanks and a lot of trucks. But when our troops begin to move because the Militia is beginning to run away already when we begin to bomb over there when our troops begin to move against the Militia. Five minutes later come back again the Castro. air force so we need again to retreat. And another thing I want to add is that the first day before I was a fighter with the B-26 I shot two trucks with Militia. I made a low pass and I saw in the first truck coming a lot of Militia with Czech machine gun and the second truck coming with Militia and Castro rebels in front. I don't want to shoot the first one because I know that there was a woman about 14 to 18 years old, but my compatriot told me that had commenced shooting, so I shoot them maybe 6 or 7 times but I already destroyed the second truck that was coming.

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement Operations "BUMPY ROAD"

1. On 24 March 1961 the Chairman of the JCS informed CINCLANT (CM 152-61) of the requirements for naval support for CIA Operation Crosspatch. This was a requirement for one destroyer to escort the CEF ships on D-2 and D-1 days to the transport area (about 3 miles off-shore). The destroyers were not to close within three miles of Cuban territory. There was also a requirement for an LSD to deliver landing craft (3 LCU's and 4 LCVP's) to the transport area and a requirement for U.S. naval air cover over the CEF ships from 0600R on 9 April to sunset that day. (Note: D-Day was then scheduled for 10 April 1961.)

2. On 28 March 1961 Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT, proposed rules of engagement to General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS. (CINCLANT memorandum serial Special 00029/61, subject: CIA Operation Crosspatch. TAB A) These rules pertained to the destroyers assigned to escort the CEF ships on D-2 and D-1 and for the combat air patrol pilots and air controllers assigned CAP missions over the CEF ships on D-1. CINCLANT also stated that he intended to provide two destroyers for the convoy in place of the one previously requested. The rules of engagement which he proposed were essentially that the escorting U.S. forces attempt to warn off any approaching Cuban aircraft or ships and if the Cuban aircraft or ships persisted in their approach the U.S. forces were to open fire when the Cuban aircraft or ships reached a position to attack or attacked the CEF ships.

3. On 1 April 1961 the JCS approved the rules of engagement submitted by CINCLANT. The JCS noted that CINCLANT had not proposed any rules of engagement for submerged submarines and the JCS added rules for such an eventuality. The rules of engagement for a submerged submarine were to attack any unidentified submarines shadowing or closing the convoy if it refused to identify itself. (CM 363-61 dated 1 April 1961, TAB B.)

4. On 2 April the Secretary of Defense was briefed on the Bumpy Road situation and advised as to the approved rules. He was further advised by the JCS that after the President had made a firm "go ahead" decision, these rules should be submitted to the President for his approval. The Secretary of Defense felt that the rules were allowed too much interpretation at lower level and stated that the JCS should study the matter further.

5. On 4 April, after the conference with the President, the Secretary of Defense requested that the JCS reconsider the rules of engagement to insure that the U.S. would not become overtly engaged with Castro forces.

6. At a meeting at the White House at 0830 R on 5 April between the Secretary of Defense, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dolles, Mr. Bissell and General Cabell, the rules of engagement were discussed in more detail, and it was agreed that the rules should definitely spell out the President's desire that if United States forces were required to protect CEF ships from damage or capture the operation would be aborted and the CEF ships directed to a port to be designated by the JCS.

7. The conference with the President on 6 April touched upon the revised rules of engagement principally to the effect that if United States naval forces were required to protect CEF ships from damage or capture the operation would be aborted. Based upon this conference CIA modified their requirements for naval support. This modification was basically the result of the decision that CEF ships should proceed independently rather than in convoy to the objective area.

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9. On 7 April 1961, the CIA sent a memorandum to General Gray, JCS Liaison Officer, modifying the U.S. Naval support requirements. These modifications were for destroyers to provide area coverage (instead of convoying the CEF ships) from 0600 R on D-2 to the transport area. The LSD requirement was unchanged. The requirement for U.S. naval air cover was changed to provide air cover over the CEF ships from 0600R to sunset on D-2 and D-1. (One extra day of air protection). D-Day was changed to 17 April 1961.

9. On 7 April 1961 the Chairman, JCS sent CINCLANT the revised rules of engagement based upon the above modifications and conferences (CM 179-61) (TAB C). Enclosure E to this memorandum gave the revised rules of engagement. The change to the rules pointed out the necessity for avoiding any sign of U.S. participation. The U.S. naval air cover was to be flown in such a manner that the planes did not appear to be covering the CEF ships. During daylight hours the escorting destroyers were to maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the CEF ships and to use courses and speeds so that they provided protection but didn't appear to be screening the CEF ships. During the hours of darkness the destroyers could close the CEF ships to provide adequate protection. The destroyers were not to approach within 20 miles (instead of the previous 3 miles) of Cuban territory and, as soon as the San Marcos (the LSD) had withdrawn from the transport area for the landing craft, the destroyers were to withdraw to join the U.S. naval task group (about 125 miles from Blue Beach). The rules of engagement were modified so that U.S. naval units would not open fire on Cuban ships or aircraft until they opened fire (or opened bomb bays) and started a bombing run. (Notes: Sea Rules and T-33's do not have bomb bays) on the CEF ships. In essence, the U.S. protecting forces could only open fire if the CEF was attacked. (Instead of opening fire when a Cuban ship or aircraft made a threatening move). If the U.S. forces intervened to protect the CEF ships, the operation was automatically cancelled. U.S. Forces were then to take all steps short of firing on the CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS. This memorandum was dispatched to Admiral Dennisson by special courier, on 8 April 1961. The naval task group was already at sea and had made an ASW sweep of the sea area off Nicaragua.

10. On 13 April, General Cabell discussed with General Bonesteel and General Lemnitzer the rules of engagement set forth in CM 179-61. He was particularly concerned that U.S. naval forces might intervene before seriously needed, thus forcing abandonment of the operation. Accordingly, a message (TAB D) was prepared which was cleared with Admiral Russell, USN, General Dean, J-3, and Admiral Wellings Deputy Director, Joint Staff and then approved by General Lemnitzer. This message was dispatched on the afternoon of 13 April to Admiral Dennisson by USO channels and may be summarized as follows:

"In summary, hope is that over all operations will not repeat not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantive risks."

11. The above rules of engagement remained in effect until 0622R, 17 April when CINCLANT was directed (JCS 994221)(TAB E) by the JCS to be prepared to provide CAP for CEF shipping outside territorial waters and Early Warning (EW) for CEF ships. At 0530R (approx) 17 April Mr. Bissell called and stated approval was received from the White House for only the employment of an EW vessel. These instructions were dispatched (JCS 994222)(TAB F) to CINCLANT at 0550R. The rules of engagement for the U.S. naval forces remained the same as previously stated except that the EW destroyers were not to close within 30 miles of Cuban territory.

12. At 1530, 17 April based upon a CIA request which had Presidential approval, the JCS directed (JCS 994247)(TAB G) CINCLANT to establish a safe haven for CEF ships with U.S. naval air cover over the CEF ships in accordance with the following restrictions:

- a. Carrier ship operation no closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory.
- b. Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory.
- c. No more than 4 aircraft on station at one time."

Further, CINCLANT was instructed that the rules of engagement were modified as follows:

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- "a. U.S. aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed towards ship to be protected or start a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by U.S. aircraft under any other condition.
- b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory.
- c. U.S. aircraft ship shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it.
- d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has occurred."

Note that the above rules of engagement still give a tactical advantage to the attacking Cuban aircraft before they can be taken under fire by the U.S. forces.

13. At 1237R, 18 April, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed (JCS 994309) (TAB H) CINCLANT to conduct a photo and visual reconnaissance using unmarked naval aircraft as soon as possible to determine the situation on the beach. The aircraft were authorized to protect themselves from attack and were to take all precautions to avoid being identified as U.S.
14. Based upon a call from Admiral Burke at the White House the JCS at 1449R, 18 April directed (JCS 994317) (TAB I) CINCLANT to prepare unmarked naval planes for possible combat use. The number to be left to CINCLANT's discretion. Further, to prepare unmarked naval boats for possible evacuation of CEF forces. CINCLANT was advised in this same message that there was no intention of U.S. intervention.
15. At 1957R, 18 April the JCS informed (JCS 994363) CINCLANT of the possibility that C-130 aircraft with U.S. Air Force markings removed might be used for night drops on Blue Beach the night of 19 April. (These air drops by C-130 were never evacuated).
16. Upon the request of CIA and with the approval of the President after a conference at the White House, the JCS at 0324R, 19 April directed (JCS 994369) (TAB J) CINCLANT to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend the CEF against air attack from Castro planes. He was directed to not seek air combat but to defend CEF forces from air attack. Further to not attack ground targets. (Note: The purpose of this CAP was to provide cover to CEF transport and B-26 type aircraft which were due at the beachhead during this period.) In this same message CINCLANT was directed to be prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees and that if the evacuation by U.S. ships were ordered he was to furnish air cover to protect landing craft.

17. At 1157R (JCS 994382) (TAB K) the JCS confirmed a telephone call to CINCLANT made by Admiral Burke at 1020R upon orders from the White House directing CINCLANT to send two destroyers to a position off Blue Beach to determine possibilities for evacuation. CINCLANT was also directed to fly reconnaissance over the beach to determine the situation. No ground attacks was authorized but active air to air combat was authorized.

18. On 19 April at 1312R, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed (JCS 994392) (TAB L) CINCLANT to have destroyers take CEF personnel off the beach and from the water to the limit of their capability; use CEF boats and craft as practicable; provide air cover; if destroyers fired on they are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission. (Note the reason that amphibious force craft were not used was that PHIBRON 2 had not yet arrived off the objective area.)


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19. At 2052H, 19 April the JCS informed (JCS 994465) (TAB M) CINCLANT that existing instructions in respect to air and surface protection for CEF ships remain in effect. This was the safe haven for CEF ships 15 miles or more off-shore. No further requirement for an air CAP in the beachhead area.

20. On 20 April, upon direction of the President to Admiral Durko the JCS at 1946R directed (JCS 994569) (TAB N) CINCLANT:

"a. Take charge of CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to VIEQUES. Navy on scene Commander can relay message to CEF ships via me.

b. Conduct destroyer patrols off Blue Beach tonight for possible evacuation of survivors and instruct CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will facilitate mission. Use of amphibious ship and craft authorized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol tomorrow night approaching area in sight of land but outside gun range prior to darkness. Provide air cover. Rules of Engagement during patrols same as before." These rules are to open fire only in self-defense.



G. A. MITCHELL
Cdr, U.S. NAVY

9 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Summary of White House Meetings

23 Mar 61

1. At this meeting the President was given the general concept for the Trinidad operation and directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate the plan from a military viewpoint.

17 Feb 61

2. Mr. Bissell discussed the means of planning and preparation. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the presence of political leaders. Mr. Rusk discussed the fact that it would be much better to delay any action and to attempt to build up OIA support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in UK. Mr. Berla believed that support could be generated in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the Western Hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the bulk up in jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked to this operation. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more aggressive approach to this problem such as mass infiltration. He indicated that he would be in favor of a more aggressive approach to this problem.

11 May 61

3. At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparations to date for the Trinidad operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead; that he could not tolerate a plan that put us in so openly, in view of the world situation. He directed the development of a plan where assistance would be less obvious and would take to most rapid within the next few days.

15 May 61

4. At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

~~SECRET~~

9 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Summary of White House Meetings

27 Feb 51

1. At this meeting the President was given the general concept for the Presidential Commission and directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate the plan from a military viewpoint.

27 Feb 51

2. Mr. Bissell discussed the nature of planning and preparations. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the withdrawal of political leaders. Mr. Bissell also discussed the idea that it would be better to delay any action and to attempt to build up OAS support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in UN. Mr. Bohlen believed that support could be generated in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the Western Hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the White House could help. He also asked if the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more moderate approach to the problem such as mass infiltration. He indicated that no definite decisions were reached at this meeting.

27 Feb 51

3. At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparations to date for the combined operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of some threat that he could not foresee a plan that put us in no openly in view of the world situation. He directed the development of a plan where no assistance would be less obvious and would have to last again within the next few days.

25 Mar 51

4. At this meeting the Zepeta plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
APPROVING AUTHORITY

~~FROM THE OFFICE~~

9 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Summary of White House Meetings

23 Jan 62

1. At this meeting the President was given the general concept for the Trinidad operation and directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate the plan from a military viewpoint.

17 Feb 62

2. Mr. Bissell discussed the nature of planning and preparations. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the emphasis of political leadership. Mr. Rusk discussed the fact that it would be much better to delay any action and to attempt to build up OAS support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in UN. Mr. Berle believed that support could be generated in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the Western hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the tails up in jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked to this operation. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more moderate approach to the problem such as mass infiltration. No concrete decisions were reached at this meeting.

11 Mar 62

3. At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparation to date for the Trinidad operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of some threat; that he could not endorse a plan that was as in no openly in view of the Cuban situation. He directed the development of a plan where no assistance would be less obvious and would take to last again within the next few days.

15 Mar 62

4. At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

9 May 1961

Subject: Summary of White House Meetings

17 Feb 61

1. At this meeting the President was given the general concept for the Trinidad operation and directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate the plan from a military viewpoint.

2. Mr. Bissell discussed the nature of planning and preparations. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the surfacing of political leaders. Mr. Rusk discussed the fact that it would be much better to delay any action and to attempt to build up OAS support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in W. Mr. Berle believed that support could be garnered in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the western hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the tails up of jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked to this operation. Mr. Pohlen expressed the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more moderate approach to the problem such as mass infiltration. He indicated decisions were reached at this meeting.

15 Mar 61

3. At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparations to date for the Trinidad operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead; that he could not envision a plan that put us in no openly, in view of the media situation. He directed the development of a plan which to a distance would be less obvious and would like to meet again within the next few days.

15 Mar 61

4. At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed.

EXEMPTED FROM GDS AND GDS

DO NOT REPLY

Improving Authority

~~TOP SECRET~~

and was told by Mr. Bissell that the plan was to divert the force to Viqueles. At the end of the meeting the President gave the following guidance: continue planning, speed the convoy, provide additional air protection for the Miami area, increase press conferences for Cardona, limit air strikes to essential targets, and diversify training as OK. In summary, the President indicated a desire to use the force but he wanted to do everything possible to make it appear to be a Cuban operation partly from within Cuba but supported from without Cuba, the objective being to make it more plausible for US denial of association with the operation although recognizing that we would be accused.

12 Apr 61

20. At this meeting CIA presented a paper which outlined the latest charges for the Zapata operation including the defections and air strikes on D-2. Many questions were discussed concerning training of additional forces, statements, if any, on D-2 operations, how to prevent headlines, and acceleration of internal troubles. The President stressed the necessity for non-association with the US and directed that all training activities being conducted within the US should stop. He was informed that 10 go films for preliminary operations would be 1200, Sunday, 14 April, and for the main landing 1200, Sunday, 16 April.

David W. Gray

DAVID W. GRAY
Major General, USA
Chief, Subsidiary Activities
Division, J-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

The President expressed the belief that uprisings all over the island would be better than to concentrate all units. The President would soon it was intended to break out from this area and Mr. Bissell stated that he was not sure about this. The President was also concerned about the ability to evacuate the force. The President did not like the idea of the force landing and felt that in order to make this appear as an initial guerrilla-type operation, the ships should be close to the area by dawn. He directed that this planning be reviewed and another meeting be held the following morning.

15 Mar 61

5. At meeting with the President, CIA presented revised concepts for the landing at Zapata. Bissell there would be air drops at first light with the landing at night and all of the ships away from the Zapata area by dawn. The President decided to go ahead with the Zapata plan; he would see what he could do about increasing support to the guerrillas inside the country; to interrogate one member of the force to determine what he knew; and he reserved the right to call off the force even up to 24 hours prior to the landing.

23 Mar 61

6. Mr. Bissell discussed the results of photo reconnaissance, the possibility of a diversionary force of 170 and a plan to obtain key captives. The President inquired whether there had been any statements by Castro indicating knowledge of the plan and answer was in the negative. Mr. Bissell presented the plan as to the disposal of the force in the event the operation was cancelled. The original idea was to break the force into Belle Glade, Florida, where they give them a chance to reassemble. The President also questioned whether the force could get into the brush and not look like a regular force. Mr. Bissell indicated that the force would be split into two groups of 100 and 70. He indicated that the operation called for a meeting the tentative date of 5 April. At this meeting the tentative date set as 10 April. The next meeting was set as 4 April.

4 Apr 61

7. This meeting was held in the State Department and Senator Fulbright was also present. Senator Fulbright

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~~TOP SECRET~~

speak out against the plan. The President again indicated his preference for an operation which would infiltrate the force in units of 200-250 and then develop them through a build up.

The belief that landing ^{the} small groups would merely serve to alert Castro and they would be eliminated one by one. He indicated that a group of 200 was below the critical number able to defend themselves. Mr. Bush expressed opposition to the plan but Mr. Beale and Mr. Mann expressed general approval. Mr. McMillan also expressed approval of the general concept. The President indicated that he still wished to make the operation appear as an internal uprising and wished to consider the matter further the next morning.

15 Apr 61

8. There was a very small meeting with the President where only Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer and representatives of State and CIA were present. At this meeting the general idea of false defections and preliminary strikes were discussed. The President indicated approval of the general idea but indicated that everyone should consider further measures overnight and there would be another meeting the following morning.

16 Apr 61

9. At this meeting Mr. Brzezinski presented the plan to arrest Max Terner, to seize a B-25 aircraft known to be operating against Cuba and also to seize one or more small ports being used by counter-revolutionaries. All of this intended to show US administration with former Batista followers. Mr. Brzezinski then gave an outline of the planned defection check pilot on D-3; coupled with air strikes and a D-2 strike on the landing. This would then be followed by a surprise landing on D+5 in Pinar del Rio. The President indicated that the council should not be informed ahead of time. Mr. Bush, when queried by the President, stated that he felt that this plan was as good as could be devised, but that he should now make a look at other questions that might arise. One would be what would the US do in the event there was a serious split in help? Second, what might the Soviets do? The President indicated that Mr. McMillan had been informed of the prospect. The President questioned whether or not a preliminary strike wasn't an alarm bell. The President also asked as to the last date on which he could delay or cancel the operation, and he was told 16 April. He wanted to know what he could do if the operation was called off

CIA (172)

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31 May 1961

SUBJECT: What briefing, if any, was given the Brigade or the Brigade's staff on going guerrilla.

REFERENCE: Paragraph F. of Memorandum Dated 22 May 1961.

The following is a summation of actions involving preparation and instruction for contingency employment of the 2506 Brigade in the event elements of the Brigade or the unit in total suffered defeat and were forced to operate as guerrillas.

1. All officers and the original cadre (some 375 personnel) which formed the 2506 Brigade received extensive instruction (in excess of 13 weeks) in guerrilla warfare organization tactics and techniques. It was with considerable difficulty and only after strenuous instruction on conventional operations that the officers of the Brigade were weaned from their marked inclination to guerrilla operations. Many of the unit leaders had in fact operated as guerrillas either with Castro forces in the fight against Batista or in the later operations against Castro after he had seized power.

2. During the evening, staff and operations classes conducted during the Brigade training cycle extending from November 1960 through March 1961, several discussions were held on the subject of a conventional force defeated in the field and forced to continue resistance as a guerrilla element. Circumstances and ways of means of organizing and operating in various parts of Cuba were discussed in detail. These discussions did not cover the Zapata area specifically for security reasons, but covered the other feasible areas to include the Escambrays, Pinar del Rio and the Oriente. These discussions were not covered with any specific direction towards the Brigade operation in these locales, but were

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in the nature of contingency operations planning, i.e., "in the event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible, we would attempt to break contact and retire to a redoubt area where we would initiate guerrilla activities." The stated mission of the Brigade for which it was organized and trained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional conflict as an organized military force. At no time did the Brigade once organized receive training to fight as a guerrilla force. To have attempted to conduct such training would have detracted from the purpose for which the Brigade was organized and would have been detrimental to morale. An indigenous force of the size of the Brigade cannot be organized and trained in the time allocated to concurrently accomplish both missions (conventional military role and guerrilla force role) satisfactorily.

4. During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and key staff officers at the training base in Guatemala (period 25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and target date) were briefed to the Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the defeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and attempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It was mutually agreed that these contingency plans would be discussed only down to the level of battalion commanders prior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension concerning success of the operation. These discussions covered both the aspects of an element or elements of the Brigade becoming cutoff from the main body and attempting to break contact with the enemy, and assume guerrilla posture, as well as the possibility of the Brigade as a whole being cutoff from the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility of its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting for guerrilla operations. It was mutually agreed that no specific plans for this eventuality could be pre-planned insofar as ground actions were concerned due both to the security provisions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as to the specific locale of the landing and the circumstances surrounding the combat action which might lead to an element or the whole of the Brigade to assume such a contingency plan.

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However, the following general provisions governing such operation were mutually agreed to:

a. Resupply to the Brigade would be primarily by air with secondary reliance on clandestine maritime craft. Drop procedures would be provided for in the Operation Plan.

b. Communications would be directed to the base control outside the target area by the five RS-1's and seven TPL radios in operation with the Brigade. (Not in the command commo trailer.)

c. Tactical integrity would be preserved wherever possible and the operational size of guerrilla units would be dictated by the specific local conditions prevalent in the operation area.

d. Command lines would be preserved with the Brigade Commander or his designated representative, preferably a senior unit commander exercising operational control of specific operational areas.

e. Local recruits and volunteers would be accepted but the Brigade would maintain the 2506 personnel in command and key positions in all formations.

f. Local law and customs would be observed, provisions or resources commandeered would be paid for or receipts given.

g. Terrorist operations effecting personnel other than GOC governmental or military personnel would be avoided.

5. At Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, subsequent to briefing on the target area, these contingency provisions were further discussed with the same individuals (Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3) with further specifics addressed to the terrain of the Zapata area. The following points were covered:

a. Red Beach Task Force (2nd Bn, 5th Bn and Co. A of 1st Airborne Bn) would hold Red Beach area in the event Blue

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Parich was forced to withdraw to the north. Blue Beach Force would withdraw to the north along the coast road. Upon junction with Red Beach Task Force at the head of the bay, the Brigade would withdraw to the south and west into the greater Zapata area, breaking contact with the enemy and assuming guerrilla operational status or preparing for evacuation in increments as feasible. Alternate courses of action (evacuation or guerrilla status) were to be implemented as dictated by the circumstances.

b. In the event Red Beach was cutoff by the enemy from contact with Blue Beach, the same course of action was to be followed by the Red Beach Force. If, however, the coast road to the Blue Beach area was open and the Blue Beach Force holding, the Red Beach Force was to retire to the south to effect junction with Blue Beach.

c. Blue Beach Force, if cutoff from Red Beach and capable of breaking out, was to move as appropriate to either or both the following areas bordering Blue Beach and attempt to evade pursuit and initiate guerrilla operations.

(1) The area bounded on the north by El Jiquil and the Jaguey Grande Red Beach road to the northeastern edge of the swamp and thence south to the Covadonga/San Blas road and the road southwest to Playa Giron.

(2) The area to the east and north of Blue Beach bounded by the Playa Giron, San Blas, Covadonga road on the west thence southeast along the edge of the swamp to the western edge of Cienfuegos Bay.

d. It was mutually agreed that this plan might not be feasible if either major force (Red or Blue) were closely pressed by the enemy. Evacuation by sea was deemed undesirable by the three officers concerned who stated that they must fight and win or go down in defeat without recourse to evacuation and that they would not consider or discuss evacuation.

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6. The Brigade Commander prior to embarkation stated that he had discussed the details of this contingency plan with the commanders he considered appropriate. He stated that he considered this plan to be particularly suitable for the small airborne contingents dropping on DZ's 4 and 5 at Jocuma and San Miguel de Pita respectively. This contingency was further discussed with the Airborne Battalion Commander De Valle on the night of 17 April prior to takeoff.

7. In summation it must be stated that little interest or enthusiasm was displayed by the Brigade personnel concerned for any aspect of the plan that involved retreat and defeat, to include this contingency for guerrilla operations plan. It was generally recognized and openly stated by the key officers that any military force involved in an airborne/amphibious landing and subsequent field operations against an enemy defending his homeland would have an extremely difficult time assuming a guerrilla role in any substantive force subsequent to defeat in the field. The defeat itself implied that the enemy in close combat had surrounded or ruptured and destroyed the Brigade as a military force, thus allowing only a fraction of its combat effectives to escape to assume a role as escapees and evaders with a limited potential for later guerrilla operations.

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Key

18

3 May 1961

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events (D-2 to D-2), and Organization and Operation of Command Post.

REFERENCE: Paragraph 4, Memorandum dated 1 May 1961, Subject: Additional Information Desired of CIA.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
(D-2 to D-2)

General. The description of events set forth herein is based upon messages and other information received at Headquarters during the operation. Comments are inserted where amplifying information is considered necessary. Later debriefing of personnel who actually participated in the operation has provided more extensive information concerning the action, but the purpose of this paper is to record what was known at Headquarters at the time.

D-2 (15 April 1961).

Air Strikes.

The purpose of these air strikes was to destroy the Castro air capability, located at Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Baños, and Santiago de Cuba, in conjunction with the air strike, one B-26 with Castro Air Force markings and piloted by a Cuban was to land at Miami with the story that he was a defector from the Castro Air Force. The purpose of the deflection flight was to conceal that the air strike was launched from outside Cuba, and to attempt to obtain mass defections in Castro's Air Force.

The air strike was carried out as scheduled at dawn D-2 by 3 B-26, allocated as follows:

- 3 - Campo Libertad
- 3 - San Antonio de los Baños
- 2 - Santiago de Cuba

ATTACHMENT III (PAR 4 REF B)

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Key doc - Shaw's JFK Treachery + cowardice (2)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

SUBJECT: Cuban Operation

1. At about 9:30 p.m. on 10 April (D-1) I was called in the CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next month, unless they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. My further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State.

2. I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come immediately to his office and discuss this decision. Mr. Blaseff joined me at the Secretary's office where we both arrived at about 10:15 p.m.

3. The Secretary informed us that there were political considerations preventing the planned air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in our hands and usable. The air strikes on D-2 had been allowed because of military considerations. Political requirements at the present time were overriding. The main consideration involved the situation at the United Nations. The Secretary described Ambassador Stevenson's attitude in some detail. Ambassador Stevenson had insisted essentially that the air strikes would make it absolutely impossible for the U. S. position to be sustained. The Secretary stated that such a result was unacceptable.

4. In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications of the decision. We told him that the time was such (now almost 11:00 p.m.) that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation

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as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat ashore, and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beach-head area the first thing in the morning (D-Day) would clearly be disastrous. I informed him that there would be four effects of the cancellation order as it applied to strikes against Cuban airfields.

- a. There would be a great risk of loss of one or more of the ships as they withdrew from the beach. This would be serious but not catastrophic, provided that the unloading had proceeded as scheduled and all planned unloading had occurred by daylight. In view of the fact that this was a night landing and close timing was required, it was pointed out that the probability of smooth performance here was doubtful. (As it turned out, the unloading was not accomplished in the time planned.)
 - b. The disembarked forces in the beachhead would be subjected to a heavier scale of air attack than would otherwise have been the case. In view of the fact that the Cuban Air Force was inadequate for massive air attacks, the attacks to be expected under the new circumstances would be damaging to these forces but not decisive.
 - c. Failure essentially to neutralize the Cuban Air Force very early on D-Day would have its most serious effect on the use of the Expeditionary Air Force's B-26s to isolate the battlefield. The B-26s were being counted upon to attack approaching Cuban ground and Naval elements and close-in artillery and tanks. No fighter cover was being provided for the B-26s and they would thus face the prospect of serious attrition during these battlefield operations. The beachhead could then be overwhelmed by the superior surface attack which could be brought against it.
 - d. Loss of efficiency would result from this late change of orders.
5. After considering the foregoing, the Secretary of State agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but confirmed that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields, a harbor, and a radio broadcasting station, could not be permitted and the decision to cancel would stand. He asked if I should like to speak to the President. I said I would and I were impressed with the extremely delicate situation with Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire

political position of the United States, and the firm position of the Secretary. We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary.

6. Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carrying out the instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require re-planning and re-briefing of crews. (This was barely accomplished as the order to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits.)

7. Our next task was to try and compensate for the loss of effective air strikes. In order to protect the shipping as it withdrew from the beachhead, I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending authority to give fighter cover. At 4:50 a.m., 17 April (D-Day), I called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiterated the need to protect the shipping. The Secretary telephoned the President and put me on the phone. After I made the request the President asked that the Secretary be put back on. After conversation with the President, the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover was disapproved.

C. F. Cabell
C. F. CABELL
General, USAF
Deputy Director

The foregoing conforms to my recollection:

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Initial pilot reports indicated that 50% of Castro's offensive air was destroyed at Campo Libertad, 75% to 80% aircraft destruction at San Antonio de los Baños, and that the destruction at Santiago included 2 E-25's, 1 DC-3, 1 Lodestar, and 1 T-33 or Sea Fury. Subsequent photographic studies and interpretations indicated considerably less damage.

Comment: The State Department had consistently objected to any air attacks on Cuban airfields or other targets in Cuba. Conversely, the military planners on this project had realized from the outset that complete domination of the air was vital to the success of any landing attack. Therefore, methods were sought whereby destruction of enemy aircraft could be achieved in a manner acceptable to the State Department. It was within this framework that the defection operation in conjunction with B-26 attacks on Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Baños, and Santiago was presented to the President of the United States, who approved the proposal. It was also the understanding of the military planners, at the time that the President gave his approval, that the D-2 strikes were to be followed by strikes on D-day on airfields and other military targets. The fact that the attacks on D-day were planned was specifically mentioned by the Deputy Director (Plans) when he briefed the President on the contemplated operation.

Diversionary Landings in Oriente.

A landing 50 miles east of Guantanamo by a group of 160 men, led by Nino Diaz, was planned for the night of 14/15 April. The landing had a twofold purpose: (1) to divert attention from the main landing, and (2) to organize guerrilla operations in Oriente Province.

The ship on which the force was embarked (Santa Ana) approached the landing point on schedule without interference. However, the landing was aborted. Reasons given for aborting were as follows:

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- (1) Friendly beach reception party did not appear on beach. (Comment: The leader was never informed that there would be a reception party.)
- (2) Reconnaissance boat was lost.
- (3) Two rubber boats were lost.

When it was learned that the operation had not been conducted, instructions were issued to land the following night. The ship remained in the area, retraced its route of the day before, and made its approach without incident. However, the landing again was not conducted. Reasons given this time were as follows:

- (1) Reconnaissance boat broke down.
- (2) Too much time lost in retrieving the reconnaissance boat.
- (3) Friendly beach reception party did not appear on the beach.
- (4) Enemy activity in area was too great.

Comment: The validity of the reasons given by Diaz for not conducting the landing are questionable. Intelligence sources did not indicate that the force had discovered by the opposition. It was finally decided at Headquarters that weak leadership on the part of Diaz was responsible for the refusal to land, and on 16 April (D-1) orders were given to this force to proceed to the Zapeta area and join the main force. The Diaz group did not arrive at Zapeta in time to participate in the main operation.

Brigade En Route to Collective Area.

The ships on which the Brigade was embarked were following widely separated courses to the objective area. According to reports received (later confirmed by observations of all ships were proceeding ahead of schedule.

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Comment: This was not considered detrimental to the security of the operation at this time because of the distance which separated the ships from the objective area.

About 1000, 15 April the Atlantic reported an automatic weapon accident in which 1 man was killed and 2 men wounded. A U.S. Navy destroyer made pick up after dark that night. Wounded were eventually evacuated to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

D-1 (15 April 1961).

Seaborne Movement of Brigade.

The assault shipping continued to move on separate courses toward the objective area. From position reports rendered by the various ships and the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Essex, it was determined that all the ships, except the Rio Escondido, were ahead of schedule. At about 0600, 16 April the ships were ordered to reduce speed in order to arrive at the remainder of reference points in accordance with Ship Movement Schedule (contained in Tab A to Appendix I to Annex H to the Operation Plan). Subsequent position reports indicated the ships complied with instructions.

The ships made their rendezvous with each other on time at about 1730, 16 April. They proceeded in column and made rendezvous with U.S. Navy LSD (San Marcos) about 5000 yards from Blue Beach. LCU and LCVP aboard the LSD were transferred to Cuban crews without incident between 2300 and 2400, 16 April.

Movement of Airborne Battalion from Base Camp in Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua

This movement was accomplished during the night of 15/16 April without incident. The troops were moved expeditiously from aircraft to an isolated area near the airfield, where briefings of troops and aircraft crews were conducted until time for takeoff for objective area.

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Cancellation of D-Day Air Strikes.

The information on the decision to cancel planned D-day air strikes against Cuban airfields and other military targets was received at the Command Post at about 2200, 17 April.

Comment: The late hour at which this information was received made it impossible to cancel the landings, though the J1 staff planners recognized the implications of such a decision. The Brigade and assault shipping were advised at this time that all Castro aircraft had not been destroyed. The Blegar (Flagship) was ordered to expedite unloading of troops and essential cargo from the Houston, Caribe, and Atlantico and send them 50 miles to sea at the earliest possible time. The Blegar and Barbara J were ordered to protect the Rio Escondido while it was being unloaded during the day. Friendly B-26's were to fly cover over the beach-head all day. It was realized at the time by the paramilitary staff that loss of ships and military supplies on board was inevitable since it was known that Castro possessed an offensive air capability which had not been destroyed.

D-day (17 April 1961).

Blue Beach

When it was discovered that resistance was to be met in the landing over this beach, the Blegar moved in close to shore and delivered gunfire support. Brigade troops commenced landing at 0100.

- 0115 - Brigade Commander ashore.
- 0300 - Unloading of troops on Caribe completed. Commenced unloading troops from Atlantico. UDI reported searching for LCU landing point.
- 0330 - Troops from Atlantico landing under fire.
- 0420 - Brigade Commander issued orders to land troops, originally scheduled for Green Beach, over Blue Beach.

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- 0500 - First LCU ashore.
- 0600 - Enemy air attacks commence on shipping and Blue Beach
- 0640 - Friendly air support arrived. (There is no mention henceforth as to what this support accomplished). ?
- 0730 - Completed discharging all vehicles and tanks from LCU's.
- 0845 - Enemy T-33 shot down by Blager.
- All troops ashore at Blue Beach.
- 0910 - Rio Escondido hit and sunk. Crew members rescued and evacuated to Blager.
- Brigade reported Playa Giron Airstrip ready for use.
- 1000 - Continuous enemy air attacks forces shipping to go to sea. At 1200 headquarters issued instructions which required sailing south at best possible speed.
- As ships withdrew they continued to come under air attack.
- 1130 - Brigade reported had only 4 hours ammunition left. (The Brigade Commander was probably referring only to Blue Beach, because there is nothing to indicate that he was in contact with units at Red Beach or with the airborne units).

The Blager went to sea in company with the LCU with the plan to load the LCU's and then return after dark to make delivery of supplies and ammunition. However, after loading the LCU's, there wasn't sufficient time (darkness) remaining to make the run to the beach, unload the craft, and retire to the seaward.

In response to the Brigade Commander's request for ammunition, at 1300 Headquarters issued instructions to base

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~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

in Nicaragua to make airdrops at head of Bahía de Cochinos and at Playa Girón. During the night of 17/18 April 1 C-54 drop was made at Red Beach and 3 C-54 drops at Blue Beach. Results of drops are not positively known due to the fact that DZ's were not lighted.

Ala. Navy
20

Red Beach

Nothing was reported to Headquarters on D-day concerning the landing at Red Beach. On D+1; the following was reported by the Barbera J concerning the D-day landing.

270 men with 6 - 61mm mortars, 1 - 75 RR, 2 - 57mm ER, 1 - .50 caliber MG, and 2 - 60mm mortars were landed. A report from the Barbera J (message dated 221004Z) indicates that these troops were engaged immediately.

The Houston came under air attack at about 170630, and was hit. The ship went aground sometime later (time undetermined) with about 180 men on the west side of Bahía de Cochinos--about 5 miles from the landing beach.

Airborne Landing.

No action reported to Headquarters from the field on D-day. Certain reliable sources outside the objective area indicate the landing took place about 170730R in pre-designated drop zones. Debriefing of pilots later confirmed that all landings were made except for one outpost scheduled for DZ-2.

Night Air Attacks.

Orders were issued at 1615 to bomb as many airfields as possible at night with fragmentation bombs. Three B-26 were launched for San Antonio de los Baños for these attacks but failed to find target due to haze and the fact that target was blacked out. 1P

D+1 (18 April 1961).

At about 0730 the 2d Battalion at Red Beach reported for first time in message traffic, saying that its position could

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not be maintained without air support for more than 30 minutes.

0824 - Brigade Commander reported Blue Beach under attack by 12 tanks and 4 jet aircraft. Ammunition and supplies requested.

6/13

(Soon after the above report, authority to use repalm was granted for use in the beachhead area).

10:0 - Red Beach reported wiped out. It was learned later during debriefing of that Deputy Brigada Commander had ordered a withdrawal to Blue Beach, which was executed in an orderly manner.

3

1200 - Blue Beach reported under attack by MIG-15's and T-33, and out of Tank ammunition, and almost all out of small arms ammunition also.

1600 - Essex reported long line of tanks and trucks approaching Blue Beach from east.

Enemy air attacks and shortage of ammunition continued to be reported the rest of the day. Three C-54 ammunition and food drops on Playa Giron were reported dropped during the night 18/19 April. One of the drops was completely successful; and the other two doubtful - one landed off the end of the runway at the airfield, and one landed in the water. No report was received as to the amount of the latter that was recovered.

D. S. C. 401

Friendly air attacks, using repalm were conducted late in the day, causing undetermined damage. Pilot reports indicate many fires to the west of Blue Beach.

1800 - 1st Battalion reported under heavy artillery attack. Position indicated at this time was considerably south of the 1st Battalion planned position north and northeast of San Blas.

- Brigade Commander continued to request jet air cover, including close support and ammunition.

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Comment: By means of a message sent from Headquarters at 2024, the Brigade Commander was informed that a C-46 with ammunition would land at the Playa Girón airfield, and would evacuate wounded. It was also recommended to the Brigade Commander that patrols armed with bazookas search out tanks and knock them out during night. Brigade commander was also informed in this message that tanks would be sent in on night 19 April for evacuation if he so recommended.

2200 - Brigade Commander sent message "I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to."

During the night many discussions were held concerning the participation of U.S. Navy aircraft over the beachhead area. The final instruction provided for Navy CAP between 0630 and 0730 to defend "CER against air attack from Castro forces." The aircraft were issued instructions not to seek air combat but defend CER forces from air attack, and not to attack ground targets. As a result of these provisions, plans were made to use all available R-26 to support Brigade, while Navy was providing air protection. Later, it was reported that Cuban pilots, flying these missions aborted prior to arrival over the beachhead, and two American crews were shot down.

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141

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- 10 -

D-2 (19 April 1961)

0630 - Enemy air strikes commenced.

0710 - 1430 -- Enemy commenced closing in on Brigade elements in Blue Beach sector with tanks and infantry in coordination with air attacks. From the beginning of this period, the Brigade Commander sent many frantic appeals for air cover and support to destroy enemy tanks

Last message - "Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot wait for you."

Comment: Commencing early morning of 19 April, serious consideration was given to evacuating Brigade during the night 19/20 April despite the Brigade Commander's assertion that he would not evacuate. Necessary instructions were issued to move shipping closer to the Elua Beach area so that the run to the beach, re-embarkation of troops, and withdrawal to sea could be done during hours of darkness. Identification of messages sent are as follows:

Hqs. Msg. No.	4835	(OUT 7239)	-	190820Z
	4839	(OUT 7269)	-	191346Z
	4840	(OUT 7271)	-	191359Z
	4844	(OUT 7283)	-	191434Z
	4850	(OUT 7293)	-	191627Z

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ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF COMMAND POST



1. The Command Post functioned in a manner similar to that of a military command post (divisional level). Representatives from the sections comprising the Paramilitary Staff operated on a 24 hour basis. Sections represented were Operations, Air Operations, Maritime Operations, Intelligence Personnel and Logistics.
2. Contact Liaison was maintained with the Joint Chiefs of Staff through Lt. Col. Benjamin Tawater (JCS Staff representative) who visited the Operations Center twice daily to obtain timely briefing notes in order to prepare and present daily JCS briefings.
3. Telephone and cable contact was maintained with Headquarters CINCLANT. Communications with the Brigade and CEF building was via CIA communication center at the operation center building (Quarters Eye).
4. The Project Chief, Paramilitary Staff and Command Post in Quarters Eye throughout the period of operations.
5. Mr. Bissell and [redacted] were also immediately available for consultation throughout the operation and frequent conferences between these officials, [redacted] were held.
6. Decisions within the competence of CIA were immediately reached in all cases. Decisions requiring Department of Defense participation were critically delayed due to the necessity for consideration at higher levels of government and political implications.
7. During the final day of the operation, [redacted] and other key military staff officers posted themselves in the communications center of Quarters Eye and responded to messages coming from the field instantly upon receipt.

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PLANNED DISPOSITION OF FORCES





ops MAP 1
8 mi

22

SECRET
Eyes Only
Sensitive


GENERAL DISPOSITION OF FORCES END OF D-DAY



149
D.P.S. 14 MAR 2

~~SECRET~~
Eyes Only
Sensitive

GENERAL DISPOSITION OF FORCES - END OF D+1



051
Ops Map 3

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23
X

26 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Colonel B. W. Tarwater, USAF
J-5, OJCS

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Documents

1. Enclosed are the following documents:

Attachment A - A brief narrative of the air activity (TS-155685-A).

Attachment B - A chronological sequence of events (TS-155685-B)

Attachment C - A report
crew, target and departure time (TS-155685-C) - on aircraft,

Attachment D - Training received by the pilots

Attachment E - Support drop missions flown from D-Day
through D+2

Attachment F - A list of personnel involved in the training
of the pilots and their background (TS-155685-D)

Attachment G - Composition of base unit This
does not include the air unit, which consisted of twenty people, the
majority of which were the Operations Staff. (TS-155685-E)

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23

Narrative of Air Activity

1. On 8 April 1961 a briefing was conducted for the Deputy Director (Plans), Acting Chief, WH-4, and Acting Chief, which outlined the proposed plan of air operations for Project and Sub-Project. Targets were as cited in Air Operations Plan 200-1 with the exception that Targets 1, 2, and 3 were to be struck on D-3 as a portion of Project. Project involved target 1, San Antonio de Los Baños, two aircraft; target 2, Campo Libertad, two aircraft; target 3, Santiago de Cuba, two aircraft.

2. On 9 April the briefing team departed Washington for . The purpose of this trip was to brief the combat elements of the proposed plan of activities. After two days target study at a recommendation was submitted to Headquarters which recommended assignment of three aircraft each to Targets 1 and 2. This change was effected.

3. On 15 April Project was implemented with strikes occurring at dawn. A 24 hour delay received 13 April changed air strikes from D-3 to D-2. Results of that strike were believed to have been destruction of 70 to 80 percent of GOC's combat air capability. Damages sustained by attacking aircraft were as follows: one aircraft and crew destroyed by anti aircraft fire eventually crashing into the sea approximately 30 miles north of the Cuban coast attempting to reach Boca Chica Naval Air Station. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman short of fuel. One aircraft landed at Boca Chica Naval Air Station, no battle damage had been incurred. The reason for landing at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station was due to this aircraft attempting to escort a crippled E-26 to Boca Chica which later crashed into the sea. The aircraft which landed at Boca Chica and Grand Cayman were eventually returned to the launch base.

4. On D-1 eleven targets were assigned the B-26 strike force designed to destroy the remainder of GOC operational air capability. Between the hours of 2100 local and 0100 local during the night 16-17 April the target assignment was changed prohibiting air strike of any airfields the morning of D day. All aircraft were committed to sustain air support over the beachhead area.

5. On D day 5 C-46's and one C-54 successfully dropped the airborne battalion at the appointed DZ's within the objective area. These aircraft returned to the launch base. B-26 aircraft were rotated over the beachhead throughout the day. The B-26 aircraft reporting the sinking of one gun boat, the destruction of one Sea Fury and one B-26, numerous strikes on ground

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23

targets and one C-46 aircraft by evasive attack caused an attacking Sea Fury aircraft to crash into the sea. Four B-26 were lost late on D day to enemy T-33 aircraft. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman with one engine shot out. One aircraft landed at Boca Chica due to pilot fatigue. It should be pointed out that all Cuban air crews had at this point been up 36 to 48 hours without sleep. Thirteen (13) actual combat sorties were flown on D day. All sorties were in support of the amphibious landing on the beachhead. At this point it became clear that enemy air activity utilizing T-33 aircraft could destroy the more obsolete B-26 type aircraft with relative ease and a decision was made to attempt to destroy the remaining GOC aircraft at night on the ground through successful bombing raids. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike the main base of operations in two waves of three each during the night of 17-18 April. The aircraft aborted on take off. Heavy haze and low clouds prevented three aircraft from finding target and one aircraft attacked San Antonio de Los Baños.

Al. NA
GJ

6. On D plus 1 it became necessary to utilize American civilian pilots to protect the beachhead area due to the fact the Cubans were either too tired or refused to fly. Six sorties were flown during the afternoon of D plus 1. Reported damage by GOC sources indicated 1900 casualties and destruction of seven tanks.

7. On the morning of D plus 2 American pilots again were pressed into service for protection of the beachhead area for two reasons (1) the reluctance of the Cuban pilots to fly more combat sorties without air to air cover and (2) the Americans were attempting to build morale and develop a will to win. Two American crews were shot down with no survivors in the morning of D plus 2. Both aircraft were lost to T-33 aircraft. All sorties down on the morning of D plus 2 were scheduled during the one hour period Navy air cover was supposed to have been provided the beachhead area.

8. In the afternoon of D plus 2 a radio message was received from the ground Brigade Commander stating that he was destroying his equipment and "heading for the hills". Upon receipt of this message all air activities in support of the beachhead area were terminated.

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CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

<u>Time</u>	<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Flown</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Emerg. Base</u>	<u>Total A/C In-cc.</u>
1. Prior to D-10	15 targets scheduled 15 aircraft committed for D-Day				
2. D-10	12 targets scheduled (Deleted 9-10-11)* 14 aircraft committed for D-Day				
3. D-9	Fury Project scheduled for D-2 (8 aircraft - 3 targets)				
4. D-2 (15 April)	3 aircraft - Libertad 3 " - San Antonio Los Banos 2 " - Santiago de Cuba 1 " - Special Project	9+ (1 abort)	1 (AA)**	2	15
5. D-1	11 targets scheduled (Deleted 5-9-10-11)* 10 aircraft committed for D-Day				
6. D-1	4 targets scheduled (1-2-8-8A)* 5 aircraft committed for D-Day				
7. D-Day (17 April)	No day targets (strategic) All aircraft committed support beachhead for D-Day	13+ (1 abort)	4 (T-33's)***	3	11
8. D-Day	Max effort night attacks on air-fields 6 aircraft committed 17/18 April	4+ (2 aborts)			

* Target numbers above are listed in Appendix 2 to Annex B to Air Operations Plan No. 200-1

** Loss due to antiaircraft fire (AA)

*** Loss due to T-33 fighter aircraft

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
MISSION	AIRCRAFT	TARGET	TIME	REMARKS
HT-26-1	933 931 935	SAN ANTONIO DE LAS BANCOS	154741Z	MODERATE DAMAGE TO AIRFIELD. LANDED GRAND CAYMAN)
HT-26-2	933 935 931	CAMP LIBERTAD	154730Z	SHOT DOWN. IN TO BOCA CHICO
HT-26-3	933 939	SAN PEDRO MIAMI	154720Z 154710Z	HEAVY DAMAGE TO AIRFIELD FACILITIES.
HT-26-6	935	SPACE		ABORT
HT-26-8	945	BLUE BEACH RED BEACH	174830Z	BOMBED RED BEACH NORTH
HT-26-9	929	BLUE BEACH	174830Z	BOMBED RED BEACH UP HWY ROAD
HT-26-10	925	INDIRECT SHIPP- ING W/2 OF PTRES	174840Z	1 FB (BAIFE) SUNK AND WENT OVER RED BEACH AND KILLED 6 TRUCKS
HT-26-11	930	" "	174840Z	1 FB (BAIFE) SUNK AND BEACH PATROL
HT-26-19	945	BLUE BEACH	171260Z	1 SEA FURY DAMAGED. LANDED AT GRAND CAYMAN.
HT-26-20	915	BLUE BEACH	171240Z	SHOT DOWN 1 B-26 AND 1 TRUCK. WAS SHOT DOWN, SURVIVED, JOINED BRIGADE AT BLUE BEACH. AIR LIFTED OUT 19 APR 61. CO-PILOT KILLED.
HT-26-21		BLUE BEACH	171240Z	CONTACTED TANGO - GAVE COVER TO SHIPS FOR 2 / 23 - CRD DROPPED AT SEA WHEN ATTACKED BY T-33.
HT-26-22	928	BLUE BEACH	171240Z	GOT TO BEACH BUT JETTISONED TANKS AND RJ TANKS WENT ON ROCKETS. DROPPED CRD IN SEA.
HT-26-23	935	BLUE BEACH	171540Z	SHOT DOWN, NO SURVIVORS
HT-26-24	937	BLUE BEACH	171540Z	LANDED GRAND CAYMAN, BOMBS AND ROCKETS DROPPED ON GLENFUEGOS AIRPORT
HT-26-25	944	BLUE BEACH	171630Z	EMERGENCY LANDING BOCA CHICO
HT-26-26	923	BLUE BEACH SAN ANTONIO " "	171630Z 181610Z	ABORT MADE NIGHT DROP - BOMBS AND ROCKETS. ABORT ABORT

FOR SPAC
NOT

23

NT-26-27	985	SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BAÑOS	172207Z	BLACKOUT AND HVT H. PRECLUDED MISSION SUCCESS.
NT-26-28	927		172230Z	DID NOT FIND FIELD. LANDED BOCA CHICO
NT-26-33	923	JOSE MARTI	180630Z	BLACKOUT AND HVT HAZE PRECLUDED MISSION SUCCESS
NT-26-37	945 927 960 965 950 955	BLUE BEACH	181907Z	INTERDICTION CONVOY OF TANKS AND TRUCKS WEST OF BEACHHEAD.. HEAVY DAMAGE INFLECTED ON CONVOY.
NT-26-38		BLUE BEACH	191030Z 191030Z 190900Z 190900Z 190700Z 190815Z 190815Z	ENCOUNTERED CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION FROM AAA AND AIRCRAFT. SHOT DOWN, NO SURVIVORS ■ ■ ■ ■
NT-26-20		BLUE BEACH	171940Z 171940Z	SHOT DOWN, NO SURVIVORS ■ ■ ■ ■

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- A. PILOT
- B. TRAINING HOURS
- C. GUNNERY SORTIES/RDS
- D. ROCKET SORTIES/RX
- E. BOMB SORTIES/BOMBS
- F. PREV EXPERIENCE/HOURS FLYING TIME

1. THE FOLLOWING INFO ON EACH A/C COMMANDER IS KEYED AS ABOVE AS REQUESTED PARA 1 REF.

(OPR NOTE: FOLL IN THREE COLUMNS SEPERATED BY DASH)

- A. B-26
- A
- B 130 - D 110 - B 150
- C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 10/2000 RDS
- D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS
- E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 10/40 BOMBS
- F 1800 MIL HRS - F 5000 MIL & CIV HRS - F 11000 CIV HRS
- A
- B 145 - B 130 - B 50
- C 9/1900 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS
- D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS
- E 9/38 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS
- F 11000 CIV HRS - F 5000 CIV & MIL HRS - F 4000 MIL (600-B-26)
- A
- D 50 - B 50 - B 60
- C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS
- D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS
- E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS
- F 3000 MIL HRS - F 3000 MIL HRS (300-B-26) - F 1200 MIL HRS

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SECRET

- A B 60 - B 110 - B 110
- C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS
- D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS
- E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS
- F 1500 MIL HRS(500-B-25) - F 1600 MIL HRS(400-B-26) - B 200 MIL HRS

- A
- B 50 - B 120 - B 110
- C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS
- D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS
- E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS
- F 1500 MIL HRS(500 B-26) - F 2000 MIL HRS(800-B-26) - F 400 MIL HRS

- A
- B 90 - B 120
- C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS
- D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS
- E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS
- F 2000 MIL HRS - F 5000 CIV HRS

AMERICANS

- A
- B 4000 FLYING HRS - B 7000 FLYING HRS - B 6000 FLYING HRS
- C 200 B-26 HRS - C 1700 B-26 HRS - C 1600 B-26 HRS
- D 40 HRS THIS PROJECT - D 15 HRS THIS PROJECT - D 36 HRS THIS PROJECT
- E BLANK - F SHOT DOWN 19 APR 61

- A
- B 4000 FLYING HRS - B 2000 FLYING HRS - B 4000 FLYING HRS
- C 950 B-26 HRS - C 230 B-26 HRS - C 850 B-26 HRS
- D 50 HRS THIS PJCT - D 50 HRS THIS PJCT - D 80 HRS THIS PJCT

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23

A F
 B 2700 FLYING HRS - B 3000 FLYING HRS - B 2000 FLYING HRS
 C 425 B-26 HRS - C 450 B-26 HRS - C 300 B-26 HRS
 D 75 HRS THIS PJCT - D 60 HRS THIS PJCT - D 75 HRS THIS PJCT
 BLANK - BLANK - F SHOT DOWN 19 APR 61

A F
 B 8000 FLYING HRS - B 16000 FLYING HRS
 C 15 B-26 HRS - C 450 B-26 HRS
 D 15 HRS THIS PJCT - D 200 HRS THIS PJCT

B. C-46

A PILOT
 B TRAINING HOURS
 C TRAINING SORTIES
 D AIRDROPS-TRAINING/MISSIONS
 E PREV EXPERIENCE

A F
 7

B 10 - B 5 - B 10
 C 20 - C 10 - C 20
 D 25/6 - D 25/7 - D 20/A
 E 11000 HRS - E 8500 HRS - E 4000 HRS

A F
 B 10 - B 10 - B 10
 C 20 - C 20 - C 20
 D 20/A - D 10/B - D 25/7
 E 6000 HRS - E 6000 HRS - E 2500 HRS

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

D 4 - D 4 - B 4
C B - C B - C B

D 25/3 - D 25/4 - D 25/9

E 2100 - E 1500 HRS - E 1000 HRS

A

D 4 - D 4 - D 4

C B - C B - C B

D 15/1 - D 15/4 - D 10/3

E 1000 HRS - E 800 HRS - E 500 HRS

C. C-54

A PILOT

B TRANSITION

C SOLO

D MISSION

A

D 10:20 - D 11:35 - D 20

C 175:55 - C 62:50 - C 79

D 11 - D 9 - D 9

A

D 3:45 - B 5:07 - B 13:20

C NONE - C 28:45 - C 41:35

D 1 - D 1 - D 3

A

D 8:50 - B 19:10 - B 14:25

C NONE - C 25:15 - C 58:00

D 2 - D 4 - D 7

~~SECRET~~

4

160

~~SECRET~~

A
D 8130 - B 10100 - D 14135
C 5155 - C NONE - C NONE
D 6 - D NONE - D 2

A
D 5 - D 10135 - D 15
C 25115 - C 24145 - C NONE
D 2 - D 2 - D 2

A
D 2 - D 9 - D 2
C NONE - C NONE - C NONE
D 1 - D 1 - D 1 (C-46)

D. C-46 AMERICANS

A
D 16000 FLYING HRS - B 8000 FLYING HRS - D 16000
C 8000 C-46 HRS - C 4000 C-46 HRS - C 8000 C-46 HRS

C-54 AMERICAN

A
D 16000 FLYING HRS - B 8000 FLYING HRS
C 4000 HRS - C 1500 C-54 HRS

A
D 16000 FLYING HRS - B 6000 FLYING HRS - B 7500 FLYING HRS
C 4000 C-54 HRS - C 2000 C-54 HRS - C 1200 C-54 HRS

1.6

~~SECRET~~

23

D 4000 FLYING HOURS - D 6000 FLYING HRS - D 8000 FLYING HRS
C 1600 C-54 HRS - C 125 C-54 HRS - C 100 C-54 HRS

2. RE PARA 2 REF

AIR COMMANDER -

PLANS STAFF

OPS SECUR -

OPS COMMO -

CONTROL -

INTEL/PI/IGIS

OPS STAFF

CHIEF FLT OPS -

B-26 OPS -

C-54/C-46 -

AIR RESCUE -

PDO'S - WINDY

MAINT - TOFFOLO

ARMAMENT - SASSAMAN

EXPERIENCE CAN BE OBTAINED HQS ON STAFF AND AIR COMMANDER.
NAVIGATORS CONDUCTED

MISSION NAV PLANNING WITH CUBAN NAVIGATORS.

FLYING EXPERIENCE LISTED ABOVE.

3. RE PARA 3

AMERICAN STAFF - 20

CUBAN STAFF - 16

4. CUDAN STAFF EXPERIENCE INCLUDED IN B-26/C-54/C-46

PILOT EXPERIENCE.

~~SECRET~~

6

162

1 PER REF FOLLOWI SUBMITTED:

A. DATE

B. AIRCRAFT TYPE

C. AIRCRAFT NDR.

D. PILOT

E. TARGET

F. REMARKS

A. 17 APRIL 1961

B. C-46

C. 855

D. []

E. DZ-3 AND DZ-4

F. LIGHT GRD FIRE DZ-3. DROPS OK ON TGT

A. 17 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. 877

D. []

E. DZ3 AND DZ-5

F. DZ-3 LGT GRD FIRE. DROPS OK ON TGT. TWO FRIENDLY TANKS AND THREE TRUCKS.

A. 17 APRIL 1961

B. C-46

C. 788

D. []

E. DZ-3

F. DROPS OK CN TGT.

A. 17 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. 678

D. []

E. DZ1-2-3

F. DZ-1 NO DROP DUE FIGHTING. DZ-2-3 DROP OK. JUMPED BY SEA FURY MANEUVERED IT TO CRASH IN SEA.

OPERATIONAL COMMITTEE

20 APR 1961

23
A. 16 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7127

D.

E. BLUE BEACH

F. DROP OK

A. 16 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7711

D.

E. BLUE BEACH

F. ABORT - DUE DAYLIGHT AND REPORTED ENEMY AIR.

A. 19 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. UNK

D.

E. PLAYA GIRON

F. ABORT - RECALLED DUE ENEMY AIR.

A. 19 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. 264

D. 1

E. PLAYA GIRON AIRFIELD

F. ABORT - PILOTS DISCRETION DAYLIGHT.

A. 19 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7711

D.

E. BLUE BEACH

F. ABORT - DUE ENEMY AIR. 2 B-26'S SHOT DOWN SAME TIME.

S E C R E T

164

TRAINING UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

591

25

PERSONNEL

Agency air operations (Washington)

I.

A. Headquarters, Washington, Personnel Support

Direct - 14 total (Security, Cover, Admin, Finance, Materiel, 6 operations)

Indirect - All sections - Operations, Weather, Intell, Admin, Security, etc., plus facilities

Organization - Hqs. Washington
Normal

1. Materiel, i.e., Operations, Materiel, Admin, etc.

Experiences - Washington

1. Chief -

b. Operations staff all highly qualified USAF air operations officers.

c. All support chiefs [] long experienced in

B.

Total - 316 (157 Cuban, 159 American)

Organization

1. Air Unit - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ - Chief and Deputy (20)

a. B-26 - 3 operations officers - 1 navigator

b. Transport (C-54 - C-46) - 3 operations officers - 1 navigator

c. Administration - Commo, Security

d. Maintenance

e. PDO

f. Ordnance

2. Base Unit

a. Chief of Support - Staff Employee full time. (In addition to performing functions of administering the base and its personnel, this man with the Chief of Security conducts all liaison with the local contracting firm the docking facility, and the local officials.

b. Finance Clerk - Staff Employee full time

c. Security Staff

1 Staff Employee full time (Chief)
1 Staff Employee TDY during operational phase
8 CIA Contract Guards
Guardia Nacionala (perimeter guards)

d. Supply Section

2 Staff Employees full time
1 full time position - staff employees rotated into this slot from
1 ANG tech

e. Medical Staff

1 Doctor full time; CIA contract employee; American
1 Staff Employee medical technician

f. Communications

10-12 full time Staff Employees

g. Messing Facility

4 ANG cooks
Indigenous cooks and waiters, etc.

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Time	Scheduled	Flown	Destroyed	Emerg. Base	Total A/C In-combat
9. D+1 (18 Apr 44)	50% all B-26's committed beach-head support	6	0	1	10
10. D+2 (19 Apr 44) (BELT 4834)	Max effort beachhead support. Navy air cover between H30Z and I230Z	7	2 (T-33)***	0	12
11. D+2 (BELT 4862)	Stand-down air activities	39+(4 aborts)	7	+ 1 Boca Chica (unaccounted)	6
TOTALS					

AMMUNITION AVAILABLE TO THE BRIGADE
IN THE P-40 MILITARY PACKS IN THE ASSAULT SLIPPER

	<u>W E A P O N S</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NUMBER BOUNDS IN PK. PACKS</u>	<u>*DAYS FIRE PER TON</u>
1.	M1 Rifles	405	323,952	44
2.	Carbines	150	---	---
3.	SMG	470	239,000	20
4.	Pistols	465	40,000	43
5.	BAR	108	212,640	39
6.	30 LMG	36	204,000	47
7.	RL, 3.5	75	2,400	8
8.	57 NR	18	512	---
9.	75RR	3	---	---
10.	81 Mortar	18	2,688	3
11.	4.2 Mortar	6	---	---
12.	60 Mortar	36	3,200	2
13.	50 Cal MG	44	32,000	11
14.	30 MG	3	---	---
15.	Flare Thrower	8	---	---
16.	Rank, 76 gun	5	---	---
17.	Hand Grenade	4 per man	22,000	8
18.	Demo kits	16 kits	220	---

*Paragraph 5.29 Estimated Expenditures of Ammunition, Assault of Hostile shore, M 101-10, February 1959

RATIONS

Troops were issued 3 days rations for landing.

57,410 Rations aboard ships in area.

21,000 Rations aboard back-up ships that did not reach the area.

39,040 Rations at Puerto Cabezas

11,000 Rations at Opalacka, Florida

3,000 Rations at Guat.

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board the Caribe and the 6th aboard the Rio Escondido, beginning at approximately 0100 hours 17 April in 4 LCVP's. Three LCU's preloaded with tanks, trucks and other vehicles were aboard a Navy LSD which would rendezvous with us five miles from Blue Beach and transfer the craft to us. They were to land on Blue Beach at first light. After the landing at Blue Beach was well underway, the Bleger was to come alongside the Atlantico and take aboard the ^{3rd} battalion and with one LCVP following proceed 16 miles east to Green Beach, put the battalion ashore and return to Blue Beach to act as Command Ship and direct the

of loading of the cargo ships. Aboard each LCI was a thousand man pack of arms and ammunition plus some resupply of ammunition. This was to be on call for the brigade ashore. The landing at Green Beach was to be conducted as soon as we felt we could leave Blue Beach, but was not expected to be done until after daylight of the 17th.

The reconnaissance of the beach itself and the marking of the landing sites was to be conducted by the UDI teams that had been especially trained for this job for the last four months. There were three of these teams: one three-man team in the Barbara J for Red Beach, one five-man team for Blue Beach, and one three-man team for Green Beach were aboard the Bleger. They were to land as soon as the LCI's arrived in the landing areas and while the LCVP's and small boats were loading the troop. It was felt that they would have about one hour to perform their

missions.

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3. Plan For Red Beach:

The LCI Barbara J. was escort for the cargo ship Houston which held the 2nd and 5th battalions into the Bay of Cochinos and land them at the head of the bay on Red Beach. This was to be done utilizing the small boats (12) of the Houston. It was planned to load each boat with ten men and their equipment. After this landing was completed the Barbara J. was to escort the Houston back to Blue Beach where its cargo was to be off loaded by the LCU's. The Barbara J. was then to patrol for ten miles to the east of Green Beach.

In all this planning we were told that early morning air strikes on the air bases in Cuba were planned and that these would take out all of Castro's air force.

4. Movement To The Beach Areas:

The Río Escondido had damaged her props on logs coming out of New Orleans enroute to Puerto Cabezas and could only do five knots so this ship was loaded first and left Puerto Cabezas on 12 April. All the other ships left on the night of 14 April and proceeded independently to an assembly area at point AA. The brigade commander and staff were aboard the Blagar. All ships arrived on station at 1730 hours 16 April and formed a column for the run into the beaches. The column was led by the Blagar and followed at 800 yard intervals by the Caribe, Atlantico, Barbara J., Houston and the Río Escondido. At five miles from Blue Beach the LSD rendezvoused with the column and the transfer of the landing craft began. At this point the Barbara J. and the Houston left the column and proceeded toward Red Beach. The Blagar moved on up to within two miles of Blue Beach to launch the UDT teams. This five-man team and departed the Blagar at 2345 hours 16 April in a seven-man, Navy rubber

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UDT boat with a 16 HP silent motor. Two men were armed with BAR's and the other four with Thompson sub-machine guns. The team was equipped with a ERC-10 radio and lighting sets for beach and buoys for marking the channels. Escorting them part of the way was a 20 foot catamaran boat from the Bingar. This boat also had a ERC-10 radio and mounted one .50 and one .30 caliber machine gun. This boat was to lie off the beach and provide cover for the UDT teams.

5. Landing At Blue Beach:

The town of Playa Giron was well lighted and a cluster of very bright lights on the right of the town proved to be from the small group of buildings at the jetty which marked the right boundary of the landing area. At about 1000 yards out, six men were observed outside these buildings looking seaward. As there were no lights or noise from the ships it was assumed that they were merely coast watchers which later checking proved to be correct. The UDT team started into the beach about 300 yards west of these buildings and at when 500 yards out, all the lights in the buildings were switched off. The UDT team discovered a coral ridge about 100 yards from the beach running across the front of the landing area and one foot below the surface. They crossed this and started the boat into the beach. Fifty yards from shore a jeep came from the town down the beach road, and headed east and picked them up in its headlights. This jeep stopped directly in front of the team and turned toward the water throwing its headlights on the boat. It then caught the full fire of two BAR's and four Thompsons and was

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knocked out instantly. The team moved on to the beach and called the Blegar on the radio and told them what had happened. They also called for an immediate landing of troops on the beach before the enemy could rush in its troops. The team placed a red light by the jeep, moved toward the Jetty 150 yards to the east and placed the other one; then moved out onto the Jetty and placed the large white light to guide the landing craft in. While this was taking place someone pulled the master switch and blacked out Playsa Oiron completely. Three trucks were then observed moving toward the beach area without lights. These trucks discharged some troops who moved in on the UDT team who were in position in some old ruins on the Jetty. The Blegar then moved in near the Jetty to lend fire support to the landing. The Blegar was armed with eleven .50 caliber machine guns, five .30 caliber machine guns and two .75 MM RR. The militia was fired upon by the UDT team when they attempted to remove the red marker lights off the beach. This fire fight was in progress when the Blegar opened fire on the beach from a distance of 400 yards, clearing it completely in a few minutes. The only return fire was from one .50 caliber machine gun firing from the direction of the town. This fire wounded one man on the Blegar and then ceased fire. After about ten minutes of firing on the beach area, the Blegar moved back and the first two LCVP's came in. They struck the coral about 75 yards from the beach and tried to ride over it but could not. They then dropped their ramps and the troops waded ashore. The first troops came ashore yelling but once on the beach moved out quickly and quietly. The UDT team called the second two LCVP's to land and warned them about the coral and had them come in slower and to discharge their troops

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as soon as they grounded on the coral. The brigade commander and his staff landed in a boat from Blagar at this time and took command of the beach. His radio was not working so his messages were relayed over the radio of the UDT team. There was no opposition to this landing as the fire from the Blagar had driven the militia away and no firing was heard until the troops started moving through the town. [redacted] then returned to the Blagar to direct the rest of the landing, and to prepare to go to Green Beach. The five men of the UDT team were left on the beach to find a landing site for the LCU's. They had the PRC-10 radio and the boat and motor. The landing of troops continued and by first light all the troops of the 4th battalion were ashore and the 6th battalion was starting its troops ashore using the small boats from the Rio Escondido. Two of the LCVP's were holed by coral and after making several trips ashore one was forced to beach itself and the other sunk but the crew was picked up and sent to the beach. The UDT team continued to search for a landing site for the LCU's with no luck until a local fisherman was found who showed them a passage through the coral that could be used at high tide about 0650. This was a narrow channel and could only be used by one LCU at a time. The channel was marked by buoys and at 0600 hours the first LCU landed. After this LCU was off loaded, it backed out and another moved into the channel. The empty one was sent to the Rio Escondido to complete the offloading of the 6th battalion. As this was taking place Red Beach called and reported they were under air attack by a B-26. About ten minutes later or at 0630 the first enemy aircraft appeared at Blue Beach. It was a B-26 which came from the east and strafed the LCU's landing on the beach causing some damage to the motor of one LCVP which proceeded into the beach under its own power. There were no casualties from this attack and

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all anti-aircraft guns were firing on the plane. It left to the west in the direction of Red Beach. As this plane was leaving two more planes were sighted coming from the west and fire was put on them before it was discovered they were a friendly B-26 escorting a C-46 for the parachute drop. When they were recognized as friendly the fire ceased. No apparent damage was done to the planes but we were told later that one paratrooper was wounded but jumped anyway. The blue wing bands that were to identify our planes could not be seen until the planes were overhead and proved to be of little value in telling friend from foe. The enemy air attacks, although practically continuous, were never in groups of over two planes each. Each plane attacked independently and when he had fired his rockets left immediately. The only types observed were B-26's, which strafed and fired rockets, Sea Fury's which usually only fired rockets (four) and T-33 jets which fired rockets also. The B-26's and Sea Fury's were usually brought under AA fire with some effect but the T-33's always came from high out of the sun and we were never able to being effective fire on them. After the first air attacks I called the brigade commander on the radio and advised him against moving the Blager east to make the landing at Green Beach. The reasons given were that the departure of the Blagar would leave the ships in the beach area without their most effective anti-aircraft fire. Also by this time we had lost 3 of the 4 LCVP's and if the enemy planes hit us on our way down to Green Beach (a 2 hour trip), it might result in the loss of the battalion plus the command ship. I told him I could put the battalion ashore right away on Blue Beach by using the LCU's, and he could then start them toward Green Beach on the road. He agreed

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to this and two of the LCU's took this battalion ashore on Blue Beach.

At about 0700 our own B-26's were on station over the landing area and we thought the air attacks were finished but at 0800 a Sea Fury came in and dove on one of our C-46's that was returning from dropping the paratroopers.

He came through our AA fire and made a firing pass on the C-46 which had dropped down next to the water and was staying within the harbor area. The

Sea Fury was caught by our fire as he pulled up from his firing pass and started smoking and crashed into the water, exploded and sank. This cheered up the AA crews and other attacks later on were met with all guns that could fire. At about this time we received a message from the Barbara J. that the

Houston was hit and sinking and that they would beach her. The Barbara J. was damaged by near misses by rockets that had split her seams and she was taking in water. She started out of the Bay of Cochinos to Blue Beach. At

this time a Sea Fury came through our fire and fired four rockets at the Rio Escondido one of which exploded the drums of aviation gasoline on her decks.

An LCU was at this time enroute to the Rio to take off this gasoline and her other cargo. The fire soon spread and it was apparent that the ship was lost.

The crew started jumping over the sides and swimming away from the ship. All the small boats in the beach area headed for the Rio and soon picked up all of her crew. These boats were about 1000 yards away from her taking the crew to other ships when she blew up and sank. The depth of the water at this point

is 600 fathoms. The crew of the Rio was put aboard the Bleagar and the gun and boat crews of the Rio were sent to the beach. A message was sent to

Headquarters advising them of the loss of the two ships and an answer was

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received directing us to take all the rest of the ships to sea and return and unload under the cover of darkness. At this time we were attacked by a B-26 and the fire from the ships and from a friendly B-26 sent him away smoking. The Barbara J. and the two cargo ships the Caribe and the Atlantico were told to proceed ahead of us and wait 13 miles out. At this time I called the UDT team of 5 men ashore on Blue Beach and told them to return to the ship as we were going out to sea and return that night. They replied that they would stay on the beach and light it for us when we returned that night. All these men were captured when Blue Beach fell. The Blagar was to escort the three ICU's which could only do six knots. Two friendly B-26's flew cover for us on the way out although the wing tank of one was loose on the front end and was hanging down. These planes stayed with us until their reserve gas supply was gone and then one of them asked permission to drop his bombs on the Cienfuegos Airport on the way home. This permission was given and he departed. Results unknown. When we reached the 15 mile point we called the other ships and told them to assemble on us but only the Barbara J. showed up. The two cargo ships could not be found nor would they answer the radio calls. Soon after the Barbara J. rejoined us we were attacked by a B-26 and a Sea Fury coming from the beach area. The B-26 started an approach on the Blagar but was hit and as the plane fired its rockets it exploded in flames. The rockets struck 50 yards from the Blagar and the plane hit the water in the same place and bounced over the ship clearing the deck by only 20 feet. It struck the water about 100 yards over the ship and burned and sank. Parts of the plane

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were scattered over the deck of the Blagar. The Sea Fury did not press his attack but made one short strafing pass at the Barbara J. hitting her with two or three .20 MM shells. He then threw four rockets at the LCU's from a high altitude all of which missed and he departed. Two more attacks were made on us later in the day by lone B-26's none of which pressed the attack. The AA fire held them at a distance and they fired their rockets wide of the targets.

After dark of D-Day we continued south hoping to make some contact with the cargo ships but to no avail. Sometime during the night a message was received directing the Barbara J. to unload her ammunition and a 500-man pack into one of the LCU's for a run into the beach that night. It was felt that the Blagar should go because of the damage the Barbara J. had sustained; however, upon charting the course we found that due to the slow speed of the LCU, we could not arrive until after daylight of D plus 1. Headquarters was notified of this and we were told not to go. While the planning for the run into the beach was underway, some of the crew of the Rio that we had rescued went into the engine room and stopped the engines. They said they would not go back into the beach area without jet air cover. They were subdued and the engines were started again. Some of the Cuban crew of the Blagar were in sympathy with them and there were some rumors of mutiny. The day of D plus 1 was spent looking for the cargo ships which joined us late in the evening. We had orders to off load all their cargo plus the ammunition from the two LCI's into the LCU's and run it into the beach that night. We were told we must be in, unload and be off the beach by daylight. The LCU's were loaded

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and we started into the beach but again we notified Headquarters that we could not arrive until after first light. We were told not to go in but to stay where we were. All this time we were the only radio link with the brigade on the beach and they were sending out a steady stream of messages from the beach. Most of them were asking for air cover and air drops of ammunition. We relayed to brigade all the messages from Headquarters and from the air base. We were told that several air drops were to be made on the night of D plus 1 on the air field and the brigade was notified and marked the strip. The first air drop on the field was made but most of the chutes drifted off the strip into the woods. (These were recovered the next morning.) The brigade then requested that the drops be made on the town itself and the two later drops that night went there; one of them was right on target and the supplies landed in the streets and were quickly recovered but the last one was too close to the water and most of the chutes drifted into the sea.

Some of these were recovered by small boats later on. We were also told that a C-46 escorted by two F-51's would arrive that night and land at the strip but they never appeared. One message also said that C-46's would land on the strip and discharge supplies and take off the wounded. The brigade was told to move its wounded (about 50 at this time) to the strip and they said they would. Later talks with survivors revealed that the brigade surgeon would not move the wounded to the strip for fear of losing them by air attacks. One C-46 did land at the strip at first light, discharged its cargo and departed taking one wounded man that the brigade commander had sent out with

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the situation report on the beach. This plane load was the last supplies ever to reach the beach. During the morning of D plus 2 the brigade kept reporting very heavy air, tank and artillery attacks from both north and east and asked continually for jet cover. These messages were sent back and we were told jet cover would be provided by unmarked jets and the brigade reported seeing them arrive over the beach area. We were not told that this was for one hour only. Later the brigade reported they were under air attack again and asked where the jet cover had gone. I could not answer this because we thought it would be continuous. The brigade also asked for close air support and sent back locations of troop concentrations and tank and artillery positions on the roads to the north. At this time the brigade was still in contact with the paratroopers to the north and was reporting them as being under heavy artillery fire and fire by tanks. The brigade reported three MIGs were over Blue Beach but it is possible they saw the unmarked jets and mistook them for MIG's. At 0500 on D plus 2 the brigade commander said that unless he got ammunition on right away that he could not hold. I told him help was on the way and we would evacuate him. His reply was that he would never evacuate and that he would fight as long as he had ammunition. At about noon on D plus 2 the Elger, the Barbara J. and the three LCU's loaded with supplies started for the beach. Our ETA was about 1800 hours. At 1300 I was told by the Navy and relayed to the brigade that close jet air support was coming. It never appeared. At 1430 the brigade commander told me that he was out of contact with all units, out of

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ammunition, fighting in the water and under direct fire from tanks 500 yards away. He said he was destroying his equipment and heading for the woods. He then went off the air. At this time Headquarters was notified and the convoy reversed course as there was no need now for going in. One hour later a friendly PBY came from the direction of Blue Beach and passed us going S.W.

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A. Action At Red Beach

The UDT team from the Barbara J. landed at about 0130 and placed the marker light on the right side of the beach but was fired on from shore when attempting to place the left marker. This fire was from small automatic weapons and was silenced by the fire of the UDT team firing BAR's and submachine guns from the rubber boat. The first troops of the 2nd battalion started ashore in the small (19 1/2 foot) boats of the Houston and the UDT team marked the left of the beach with a flashlight from 100 yards out in the rubber boat. The second wave received fire from shore while on

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the way in. This fire was silenced by the Barbarys, firing over the heads of the landing force. The militia fled leaving some of their weapons behind. Once ashore the troops moved through the town and cleaned it out. The landings continued until all the 2nd battalion minus one squad was ashore and the weapons company of the 5th battalion landed also. (For more details on this period see report by ? on Red Beach.) One survivor, the Company Commander of the weapons company of the 2nd battalion stated that soon after daylight the beach was secured and they had captured over 40 prisoners. They discovered that 12 militia had been stationed in the town to guard a small militia radio station but that 30 or 40 had come in the day before on a picnic and were spending the night there. After the town was secured and the radio station was captured, the force which was under the command of the Brigade Deputy Commander sent a group out and captured a motor pool of trucks and gasoline at a motel and park construction project west of town. He also stated that 40 men from this small village offered to join them and fight against Castro. These men were put to work driving the captured trucks and other labor jobs on the beach. They were in complete control of the town and were not hurt by the air attacks which were directed against the town itself. These attacks and later ones caused many civilian casualties. The first attack by the militia came at 1000 on D-day and was from the north. This force was estimated at between 500 and 600 militia and had some tanks but friendly airplanes knocked out the tanks before they could go into action. This attack was beaten off with very heavy

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casualties suffered by the militia. As they were running short of ammunition a call for help was sent to Blue Beach and one tank and two 2½ ton trucks of ammunition was sent to them along the beach road. This arrived at 0000 just as the next big attack was about to hit them and the tank went into action as soon as it arrived. This attack was launched down the road from the north. The troops, all militia, were in open, 2½ ton trucks and open, semi-trailer trucks. The fire of the tank and the 57 MM R.R.'s, 3.5's and the 50 caliber machine guns of the landing force hit them before they could get out of the trucks. This force was estimated at 1500 and all the survivors of this action claimed they killed or wounded over half of them and destroyed most of the trucks. The next attack came late in the evening and continued all night. During the night action at least five enemy tanks were knocked out, two Russian ones and three American Sherman tanks. These were destroyed by 57 MM R.R. and 3.5's. How many were knocked out by the tank is unknown. The militia at one time sent an ambulance under a white flag to pick up wounded but tried to sneak two trucks loaded with militia in behind it. The tank destroyed all three vehicles with one round and the machine guns finished the job. At another time some militia that were trapped in some buildings came out to surrender but when the CEF troops moved toward them they dropped to the ground and opened fire. All this group was then wiped out by the CEF troops. The survivors stated that all the troops opposing them were militia and all prisoners had the Communist party card on their persons. When asked about these cards they stated that if they

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they had no cards, they could not get work. Most of the militia stated also that they were willing to fight against Castro. At about 0730 on D plus 1 the force at Red Beach was low on ammunition and was withdrawn to Blue Beach in the captured trucks, their own trucks and the tank. They took their wounded with them but released all their prisoners upon departure. They destroyed the radio station and all the trucks that they could not use. Upon arrival at Blue Beach they held a muster to account for everyone. Blue Beach at this time on D plus 1 was quiet and the survivors stated that they had lunch and slept, cleaned up and were issued ammunition. That afternoon they went into action at Blue Beach, fought all night and at about 1100 the next morning 90 men of the 2nd battalion under the command of the Deputy Brigade Commander was sent back to Red Beach to stop a large column of militia, tanks and artillery that was massing there. This force it is believed never reached Red Beach but it is known that they went into action because they called for mortar fire and the 2nd battalion mortars fired 120 rounds for them and then was out of ammunition. Two tanks went out with this group and was seen coming back to Blue Beach about 1300 damaged and out of ammunition. Nothing more was heard of this group and soon after the enemy force came down the road from Red Beach and attacked it from the west. This force was very large and had heavy artillery (larger than 4.2) and tanks. One survivor stated that at 1400 he went to Brigade Headquarters which was by the beach for ammunition and the Brigade Commander and staff were there but when he made a second trip at 1530 the Brigade Headquarters was gone and also a sailboat that was tied

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up near it. He states that starting at 1600 the front lines collapsed due to the lack of ammunition and at about 1700 all resistance ceased. He left Blue Beach with four companions in a row boat and saw many other small boats leaving at the same time. The enemy planes strafed these boats and caused many casualties. His boat drifted all night and at dawn they found themselves on the beach on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos. They then made their way down the keys to the point to where they were rescued by the UDT teams. One survivor stated that his company was hit in Blue Beach on the night of D plus 1 by a shell fired from a tank that emitted some smoke and threw droplets on their clothing. The droplets did not burn, but the smoke did and caused choking and pain. They ran out of the area and when they returned later they found several dead from this shell, but he claims there were no wounds and the men died from what he thinks was a gas shell. He also stated that the next morning several men told him of the same thing occurring in their sectors, also by tank fire. Detailed action on Blue Beach is unknown due to lack of any survivors who landed there in the original force.

B. Sinking of Houston:

The Houston was hit sometime after first light by rockets while still at Red Beach. These rockets started fires in the number one and number three holds and the Houston pulled out from the beach. The fires were put out by the crew and the ship turned and started back in. At this time she was hit the second time by two rockets fired from a T-33 jet. These

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struck the stern somewhere around the screws knocking out the steering. The ship was crosswise in the bay and could only go forward or backward. She attempted to back up but started sinking by the stern so the Captain ran her up on the beach on the west side of the bay. This was about five miles south of Red Beach. The planes came back again so the order was given to abandon ship. Aboard at this time was one squad of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 5th Battalion plus a 20-man ship's crew, approximately 220 men. Six men were killed by the air attack and seven more drowned swimming to shore. Small boats were used plus lines to the shore to get the men off. After everyone was ashore the C.O. of the 5th Battalion took command and organized a perimeter. He then sent men back aboard to try to salvage what arms and equipment they could. Some was gotten off but as the holds were filled with water, this was not easy. He then sent scouts out in the direction of Red Beach, but they returned and told of running into militia between them and Red Beach. This beach perimeter was held until D plus 2. Some food and water was gotten off the Houston but not nearly enough. On D plus 2 a patrol craft about 35 feet long and mounting one machine gun came from the east and pulled up the Houston. It is believed that this was the Castro craft SV-3. The boat checked the Houston and then came in to the beach to check the three small boats drawn up on shore. When it reached the beach, the troops ashore fired on it and killed four of its six-man crew. Two were captured. The Captain of the Houston then took this craft together with the C.O. of the 5th Battalion, the padre, two or three of the doctors and five other officers of

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the 5th Battalion out to the Houston and put aboard all the gasoline and supplies they could find. The Battalion C.O. then gave the order for the beachhead to break up in small groups and try to get out to the south. Some groups went to the north, some went inland but most started down the Coast to the south. The Battalion C.O. then left to the south in the captured boat and said he was headed for Grand Cayman. Out of the groups who started south down the beach 21 were later rescued, including some of the crew of the Houston.

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Within twenty minutes of the reconnaissance team's initial contact with the enemy, six or seven trucks were seen entering the area from the left flank. The writer called for supporting fire from the Barbara J. The Barbara J's first shots hit the lead truck and threw the convoy into darkness and confusion and apparently helped delay the convoy's arrival at Red Beach until later in the morning.

The reconnaissance group proceeded then to help in landing the troops. These troops were landed with approximately two units of fire and a minimum of equipment other than their personal weapons and the unit weapons. The unit weapons we succeeded in getting ashore were four .30 cal light machine guns, four Elum mortars, and four 57mm recoilless rifles, plus 3.5 rocket launchers. On the second trip to Red Beach, our boat was hit by machine gun fire coming from about 200 yards left of the Red Beach left flank. One man in the boat was killed. On arrival at the beach this second trip, the writer sent for a representative of the 2nd Battalion command post, and between the two, an airstrike plan was set up in the event that communication might be cut when the daylight airstrike arrived. In the plan, the aircraft would take on any targets moving along the beach towards Red Beach or along the road from the north towards Red Beach, and at first daylight the 2nd Battalion commander would send a well-briefed officer to the beach carrying a red flag for further conference with the writer. The commanding officer at this conference requested that future landing craft be landed nearer the right flank of the beach in as much as all enemy activity to date was being encountered from the left. There were explosions within the beachhead at this time which the writer took to be incoming mortar fire with some light calibre.

During this period, some .50 cal machinegun fire was directed at the Barbara J. The Barbara J was lying about 500 yards offshore and the Barbara J engaged this machine gun and silenced it.

The Houston reported that there were no small boats, so our recon team tied onto one of the Barbara J's rubber boats to the lee side of the Houston where we found seven or eight small aluminum boats huddled with no troop movement going on. The writer climbed aboard and got a boat-load and a half of soldiers off-loaded before being stopped by a Cuban believed to be the 5th Battalion Commander. The writer believes that this man's intention was to wait until first daylight before continuing off-loading the 5th Battalion. At this point, 270 soldiers had been off-loaded. This was the 2nd Battalion Reinforced and the weapons company from the 5th Battalion and the Assistant Brigade Commander.

On the trip into shore, first daylight had arrived and at approximately 6 o'clock a B-26 appeared low and machine-gunned our small boat without success on this first run. When he came again we turned our

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small weapons and the weapons of all the soldiers in the small boat and fired back at him. On this pass the B-26 wounded one soldier with a frag: shot that passed through another man's weapon before hitting the soldier. On the third pass of the B-26, he immediately, after passing overhead, started smoking and wobbling and soon went down over land with one survivor parachuting out.

A second B-26 appeared and started after the Barbara J and Houston. He strafed and dropped two large bombs, both misses. The Barbara J's skipper was circling the Houston tightly and bringing all her fire-power in support of the Houston during this action.

At this point, our cargo planes bearing paratroopers and accompanied by two friendly B-26's arrived in the area and the enemy aircraft departed. At the departure of our aircraft, we were attacked by a fighter plane which I believe was a Sea Fury. The skipper of the Barbara J decided to disperse until our air cover had better control and so moved the Barbara J and the Houston away from Red Beach about five miles.

The writer suggests that the following is a likely account of the short history of Red Beach. The account is compiled from observation and interrogation of survivors. Very little action occurred at Red Beach before daylight. Most of the shooting was our own. The air attack at daybreak, which included bombing and strafing the beachhead, damaged nothing important. At approximately 1000 a truck-mounted attack from the north involving 500 of 600 militia was broken up by Red Beach forces. This was accomplished with small losses to our forces and considerable loss to the militia. Fifty to seventy of the militia were captured, most of which were willing to join the Red Beach forces. The paratroopers were apparently engaged immediately upon landing, and link between the paratroopers and Red Beach forces was not accomplished. At 1400 on D-Day, another attack was made from the north involving 1,500 militia, an unknown amount were destroyed en route to this battle by a friendly B-26. Two of our own tanks which had been sent up from Blue Beach assisted in stopping this attack. From all accounts, this force was well handled by our forces, and we claimed 1,000 casualties were inflicted. Seven tanks, which arrived after midnight were engaged by our 57mm recoilless rifles and 3.5 rockets, and five were destroyed. On D+1 an orderly withdrawal to Blue Beach was effected, since Red Beach was out of ammunition. Red Beach losses at this time were 25 dead, and an unknown amount wounded. The wounded were carried to Blue Beach.

On arrival at Blue Beach, the 2nd Battalion was put into the Blue Beach defense line which had been comparatively quiet till this point. In the afternoon, a battle started which put 1,500 militiamen against the 2nd Battalion. This battle lasted all night. The following morning an attempt was made to regain Red Beach, but the 2nd Battalion encountered

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tanks, trucks, troops, and artillery, and it is believed, did not reach Fed Beach. The heavy mortars supported the 2nd Battalion until out of ammunition. Two tanks which were supporting the 2nd Battalion were returned to Blue Beach damaged by this action. It is believed that the 2nd Battalion was lost with Blue Beach.

At the time when the skipper of the Barbara J ordered the dispersal of the convoy, a B-26 arrived requesting targets for his bombs at Fed Beach. He was instructed to go to Objective A on the north road and engage any mobile forces moving towards Fed Beach. He located a convoy moving into Fed Beach with Blue marked trucks and was refrained from interfering with this convoy since it was known to be ours.

At this point the skipper of the Barbara J turned the convoy back towards Fed Beach. The Barbara J and the Houston arrived off the point Carazones. When a T-33 jet arrived and strafed and fired rockets, with near misses for the Barbara J and hits on the Houston, a welded seam on the Barbara J was split, causing the Barbara J to take water at the rate of four feet each two and a half hours. The Houston announced the loss of their steering capability, and was at this time headed towards the beach. The skipper of the Barbara J ordered the Houston to reverse engines and back away from the beach. The Houston attempted to do this, but was observed to begin sinking rapidly by the stern. At the same time another Sea Fury started attacking the Houston. Gasoline was covering the water all around both ships, and the Houston reversed its engines again and made straight into the shore, grounding about 100 yards off-shore. As she struck shore, men were seen diving over the side in life jackets. The Sea Fury continued its strafing runs against the ship and the men in the water. From subsequent reports, we believe from seven to twenty men were killed in the strafing, and ten drowned from inability to swim. The Barbara J had no small boats; the Houston didn't attempt to use its three small boats. There was speculation as to whether we should attempt an evacuation, but this was tempered by the idea that the occupants of the Houston were scheduled to go ashore with the possibility that they could make a tie-up at Fed Beach. The Barbara J was ordered to move to the Blue beach to provide protection for the unloading operations there, the ships at Blue Beach being under air attack also.

From interrogation of survivors, it is learned that the Houston group proceeded towards Fed Beach, but the scouts observed militiamen, and the entire group withdrew to the swamp. My last radio contact with this group was an announcement by the 5th Battalion Commander that he had successfully regrouped 1 1/2 miles west of the sunken ship. Information on his position was requested for an intended air supply drop. Within a half hour he was under attack. His request was for small boats so that he could strip the Houston of necessary supplies. Arrangements were made for PB-12 rubber boats and paddles to be dropped at first darkness. Within a half hour after this arrangement, the Houston was under attack and apparently the enemy was trying to split it up. I feel that our voice of communication was being monitored. The

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following right an enemy patrol craft approached the Houston and landed five militiamen. These five were attacked by the survivors of the Houston. Two militiamen were killed and three taken prisoners. The three prisoners were executed because of the logistical problems they made for the survivors. On the 19th the skipper of the Houston, the 5th Battalion Commander, five 5th Battalion officers, the Chaplain, and three doctors left the beach in the captured patrol craft, bidding their men to scatter and make out for themselves. This flight indicate a reason why the 5th Battalion seemed reluctant to go ashore at Red Beach. Of the remaining men, a few immediately made their way north through the swamps, and a few made their way south. Those that were rescued on the southern islands has swim most of the way in the swamps. The Houston skipper and the small boat reportedly departed for Cayo Guano, but radio Cuba reported it landed at Cayo Largo and the men were captured.

As the Barbara J departed from Bahia Cochinos, a Sea Fury was circling, but apparently was bluffed by two or our B-26's which were flying protection for Barbara J. A jet T-33 was seen to attack one of the B-26's, and the B-26 was seen to fly lower and to either crash or make a crash landing on the airstrip at Blue Beach area. The remaining B-26 hovered over the Barbara J, reported he was out of ammunition, and asked for instructions. I requested that he stay as long as possible to bluff enemy aircraft, which he did, until he had only fifteen minutes reserve gasoline supply. This man's name was and should be commended for courageous work.

At the entrance of Bahia Cochinos we had observed the Rio Macondido catch fire and blow up.

On arrival in the Blue Beach area, all ships were ordered south. He departed with the Atlantico and Caribe leading, and the Barbara J providing close support. The U-boats protected by the Blagar followed. The Blagar requested all ships to merge for mutual self-protection. The Barbara J joined the Blagar and U-boats, and the Caribe and Atlantico disappeared over the horizon. One strafing and bombing pass was made on the right flank LCU, with the Blagar and Barbara J giving her support. What appeared to be a salvo boat of shore-based artillery splashed five shells within the convoy on the way out. This was possibly 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock in the afternoon of D-Day.

At approximately 3:30, when the convoy was outside the continental limit, a sea fury and a B-26 attacked. The Sea Fury circled high and the B-26 came for a low strafing attack, lining up the Barbara J and the Blagar. As the B-26 passed over the Blagar, it exploded in a direct ball of flame. It is believed that hits from Blagar guns had entered the gas tanks, and that the pilot fired his rockets, causing the explosion. The Sea Fury then circled for a few minutes and started

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a run on the Barbara J, but peeled off early, probably because of the Barbara J's gunfire. He scored 20mm hits on the Barbara J. At this time we were ordered further out to sea.

Preparations were made for a night run into Blue Beach. When the order arrived, headquarters was notified that we were not able to arrive at cargo ships, and that it was felt that it was impossible to arrive at Blue Beach before daylight. Air and/or sea support was requested, with the warning that we felt we were sure to be sunk without this protection and thus be no good to Blue Beach. During the night we were ordered to cancel this run. The following evening the cargo ships had been reassembled, and the Caribe was unloaded into LCUs. The Barbara J was unloaded into an LCU when the order came for the Barbara J to make an 500-man pack supply run to Blue Beach. The Barbara J was leaking and one bank of engines was out and emptied of supplies and had no small boats, so the responsibility was shifted to the Blegar. The writer transferred to the Blegar to assist in this run and to assist the Blegar Operations Officer with communications functions. At approximately midnight the run was started, with an additional warning to headquarters that we were going to arrive in daylight. An air or sea support was necessary. Some time during the night this trip was cancelled.

The writer relieved the Operations Officer of the Blegar in communication duties at times during the night. The gist of the communication can be summed up as follows: The Brigade commander continually reported he was out of anti-tank ammunition and additional supplies and had wounded to evacuate. All messages were forwarded to strike base and U. S. Navy. From strike base and U. S. Navy we continually received assurances that re-supplies and evacuation of wounded were being carried in and that a close air support strike was arranged for first light. A tank column had been located coming into Blue Beach from the north. Its exact location was reported by the Brigade Commander. Arrangements were made for strike base to take on these tanks at first light, and U. S. Navy jets were "on the way." The jets had not appeared when first light arrived and their whereabouts was requested. We were told that they were still "on the way."

At 20 minutes daylight a request from headquarters came that

go on beach to evaluate the situation.
No boat operator was found who would go. Subsequent activity negated this operation.

At daylight the beach was under air, tank, and artillery attack. During the night, two re-supply drops had been made, part of which went into the ocean, part of which was received. A C-46 had landed on the airstrip, dumped its supplies, and departed evacuating one wounded.

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The Bristol commander began talking in terms of his men standing in the water fighting, and "being massacred" and "murdered". At one point he could see four Navy jets high overhead, and was being attacked simultaneously by three enemy Sea Fury's. When he asked that the jets enter the fight and was told that we were doing everything to get permission, his comment was "God damn it, God damn you, God damn you. Do not wait for permission". He continually spotted tanks, artillery locations, and continually asked when would they be attacked by our airplanes. About midday the base announced that we were going in in full force; shooting, for evacuation purposes. The Brigade commander was told that within three hours the Navy forces, air and sea, plus our cargo convoy would be there to pick them up. He announced that an enemy tank was within 400 yards of his command post firing at him and he had no ammunition with which to fight it. He said he would not be there in three hours. In his next message he said he was destroying his communications set and going into the woods. We were trying to get him to hold on when communication abruptly broke. We have two reports: (1) That the Brigade commander was seen going to sea in a small sailboat, and (2) That he had gone inland to Exoambrey. The convoy started out to sea.

On the morning of D+3 the operations officers of the Blagar and the Barbara J were transferred by rubber boat, along with six UDT men and personal weapons and radios, aboard the . Subsequently we boarded the aircraft carrier Essex along with the commander of the destroyer group, Captain Crutchfield, for the purpose of conferring with Admiral Clark and about effecting rescue operations. It was generally thought among all concerned that the Houston survivors could be sought only if the information concerning them was recent, accurate, and reliable. The was dispatched towards Bahia Cochinos with our operations officers and UDT men aboard with the understanding that and Clark would seek information on the validity and accuracy of intelligence concerning survivors on the beach, and would send authorization or cancellation of that operation prior to the arrival of the on station. The operation was cancelled by Admiral Clark and we spent the night sailing close to the beach for light signals. At daylight movement was seen on Cayo Blanco del Sur. A rubber boat was dispatched and contact made with four survivors, who were pulled aboard. A whaleboat was dispatched from the and three UDT men to a position 200 to 300 yards off the beach, from where we would make the approach and contact with the survivors by rubber boat. Seventeen survivors were removed in five separate operations by this group over a period of two days. Pre-dawn landings and reconnaissance were made each day to assure that Castro's militiamen hadn't occupied the island during the night. and Similar activity was conducted by the Blagar and three UDT men on other beaches. The final day these two groups swept

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